June 21st, 2009
WHATEVER happens in Iran in the aftermath of this month’s fraudulent elections, one thing is clear: we are witnessing not just a fascinating power struggle among men who’ve known each other intimately for 30 years, but the unraveling of the religious idea that has shaped the growth of modern Islamic fundamentalism since the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928.
The Islamic revolution in Iran encompassed two incompatible ideas: that God’s law — as interpreted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini — would rule, and that the people of Iran had the right to elect representatives who would advance and protect their interests. When Khomeini was alive and Iran was at war with Iraq, the tension between theocracy and democracy never became acute.
Upon his death in 1989, however, the revolution’s democratic promise started to gain ground. With the presidential campaign of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, it exploded and briefly paralyzed Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the theocratic elite. God’s will and the people’s wants were no longer compatible.
To the dismay of Ayatollah Khamenei, who remains supreme leader, Mir Hussein Moussavi, the candidate whom President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad “defeated” in the rigged elections, has become the new Khatami — except he is far more powerful. While Mr. Moussavi lacks Mr. Khatami’s reformist credentials, he is a far steelier politician. And the frustrations of President Khatami’s failed tenure have grown exponentially among a new generation that is less respectful of mullahs and revolutionary ideology.
Yet in the current demonstrations we are witnessing not just the end of the first stage of the Iranian democratic experiment, but the collapse of the structural underpinnings of the entire Islamic approach to modern political self-rule. Islam’s categorical imperative for both traditional and fundamentalist Muslims —“commanding right and forbidding wrong” — is being transformed.
This imperative appears repeatedly in the Koran. Historically, it has been understood as a check on the corrupting, restive and libidinous side of the human soul. For modern Islamic militants, it is a war cry as well — a justification of the morals police in Saudi Arabia and Iran, of the young men who harass “improperly” attired Muslim women from Cairo to Copenhagen. It is the primary theological reason that Ayatollah Khamenei will try to stop a democratic triumph in his country, since real democracy would allow men, not God and his faithful guardians, the mullahs, to determine right and wrong.
Westerners would do well to understand the magnitude of what is transpiring in the Islamic Republic. Iran’s revolution shook the Islamic world. It was the first attempt by militant Muslims to prove that “Islam has all the answers” — or at least enough of them to run a modern state and make its citizenry more moral children of God. But the experiment has failed. The so-called June 12th revolution is the Iranian answer to the recurring hope in Islamic history that the world can be reborn closer to the Prophet Muhammad’s virtuous community. Millions of Iranians said in the presidential election, and more powerfully on the streets since, that they want out of Ayatollah Khomeini’s dream, which has become a nightmare.
No matter what Ayatollah Khamenei does — and at his most recent Friday prayer sermon he gave no inclination he’s ready to stop hammering the reformers — this message isn’t going to change. In the nine years since the reform movement around Mr. Khatami was crushed, it has only grown stronger. It brought within its ranks Mr. Moussavi, a favored lay disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini, who clearly has no regard for either Mr. Ahmadinejad or the supreme leader.
What may seem more surprising is that so many prominent first-generation revolutionaries have sided with Mr. Moussavi. There are many reasons for this, but among the most salient is a growing belief that the Islamic Republic and the revolution are finished unless Iran becomes more democratic. This hope may be naïve (once glasnost starts …), but it is a powerful motivation for those who gave their souls to overthrow the shah.
It’s not clear what Mr. Moussavi thinks about democracy, but it’s a good bet that he’s willing to entrust the people with more power than was Mr. Khatami, who despite some differences could neither really break with his ruling clerical brethren, nor free himself from the age-old Islamic belief that the faithful need clerical supervision. And even if Mr. Moussavi isn’t the ideal reformer — he was prime minister in the 1980s — he is surrounded by the best and brightest of Iran. The regime has lost almost all the country’s intellectual capital. Even among the clergy, the best minds — the ones faithful Iranians talk about, like Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri — have distanced themselves from Ayatollah Khamenei. I can’t think of a serious book written by an Iranian since the fall of Mr. Khatami expounding the Islamic Republic as a model for Muslims.
The reverse parallels here with the rest of the Islamic Middle East are striking. Where secular dictatorships rule, the best and the brightest are often attracted to the Islamist cause. The moral repugnance of these regimes trumps the appeal of their Westernization. Muslim fundamentalists often espouse democracy either because it is the only peaceful means of dethroning their rulers or because they really do believe that most Muslims are “good” Muslims. Democracy would make their societies more virtuous, they feel, more likely to preach and practice the traditional injunction to command good and forbid evil.
Until now, the Islamic Republic has had a propaganda heyday among devout Arabs, depicting itself as a virtuous state with a workable level of democracy — just enough to give the regime legitimacy and stability. Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran’s Parliament and the wicked genius behind the crushing of the reform movement during Mr. Khatami’s presidency, loves to emphasize Iran’s democracy when he travels abroad, always highlighting America’s preference for secular dictatorships.
Now the clerical regime can no longer make this argument. As Iranians have come to know theocracy intimately, secularism has become increasingly attractive. Iran now produces brilliant clerics who argue in favor of the separation of church and state as a means of saving the faith from corrupting power.
Indeed, Iranians are on the threshold of turning the Koran’s ethical injunction into a democratic commandment: nothing good can be commanded without a vote of the people. The democracy-supporting clerics of Iraq are trying to do the same thing, but the Iranians, much further advanced in their thinking about church and state, will surely be much bolder. Whether he intended it or not, Mr. Moussavi — and indirectly Ayatollah Khamenei because of his crude determination to keep the former prime minister from power — has probably begun the final countdown on the Islamic Republic.
We can only guess about the effect of an Iranian crack-up on the rest of the Middle East. Although the region’s Sunni rulers were spooked by the aggressiveness of Mr. Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei (not to mention the idea of a Shiite state with nuclear weapons), the birth of real democracy in Iran, always the most dynamic state in the region, cannot but cause acute anxiety. Sunni Arab fundamentalists, whose day has not yet arrived, will be fascinating to watch. They will surely see the awesome power of democracy; they will probably conclude, however reluctantly, that God cannot be the sole legislator of the laws and ethics that good Muslims want to live by.
And American policy? For starters, many of America’s supposed allies may welcome a Khamenei crackdown. This may complicate matters for President Obama. But he should take note: inside Iran, the nuclear issue isn’t what the people are fighting about. They are fighting for freedom. Even if Ayatollah Khamenei proves triumphant in this round, the president should get on the right side of history. He has nothing to lose: the supreme leader is never going to give ground on the nuclear issue. And as the clerical regime gets nastier at home, it will become nastier abroad. Mir Hussein Moussavi is Mr. Obama’s only hope.
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History 434
Richard A. Smith (rasmith8)
Is Iran Headed for Glasnost or Tiananmen?
I have travelled to Teheran, Moscow and Beijing and have a vivid recollection of Revolution, Red and Tiananmen Squares. The current struggle in Iran between the reformers (forces of democracy) and the strong-armed conservatives (forces of the theocracy and status quo), is extremely fluid and a predictable outcome cannot be determined at this time. Whatever consequences occur in Iran, they will have a uniquely Persian flavor, influenced by the theocracy and will have similarities and differences from the democracy movements in the former Soviet Union (Glastnost/Openess) and China (greater freedoms and economic reforms.)
Iran’s government must now decide whether to “back down or crack down” or establish a hybrid between the two strategies. The theocratic regime is losing its legitimacy in part because of economic failure and the belief that there was electoral fraud. Iranian nationalism will be influential and could be decisive. Mousavi’s supporters may prevail in Iran if they have sufficient public and political support, including the country’s military and security forces as was the case with Boris Yeltsin in the Soviet Union in 1987.
This is truly a historical moment in Iran where inter-generational groups of students, women in chadors, shopkeepers, workers, and even turbaned clerics have joined together demonstrating the power of the people. This blend of political and electronic revolution represents an Iranian-type Tiananmen Square protest that occurred in 1989. There is a possibility that this movement may eventually split the cleric-military-state apparatus.
There are unintended consequences of revolutionary movements. For example, ethnic tensions throughout the Soviet Union resulted in the Baltic Republics asserting their independence; in China, there was a massacre of students protesting for democracy, in Tiananmen Square.
American history has given us a profound and complex experience with democracy and revolutionary movements. Theodore Roosevelt supported a group of Revolutionaries in Columbia, showed naval presence in the region and signed the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty so that the United States could build the Panama Canal. William Howard Taft condemned Theodore Roosevelt for negotiating with Japan and Russia which legitimized their autocracies. The Wilsonian Paradox called for democratic change but resulted in an interventional policy leading to W.W. I. Thus, his idealism to protect democracy and build a better world required going to war to “make the world safe for democracy.” Woodrow Wilson’s dilemma was characterized by engagement in foreign revolutions that could result in outcomes not always in the best interest of America. These experiences of American history should be scrutinized and analyzed by policymakers to plan the most effective strategy for the United States in dealing with the Iranian crisis.
I believe that Iran is going in the direction of the Glasnost because the head Islamic religious leaders are against the political leader in Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Although the Government of Iran is trying to stop information about the protests from getting out of the country, young people have the technical savvy to Twitter and use their phone cameras to take pictures and email them though out the world. Also, Iran is made up of a large population of young people that are interested in more freedom. A large percentage of the people protesting are women who are looking for more equality.
I believe that protests from the citizens in Iran do the best way of showing the world that then need help from other countries to overthrow this corrupt government. After researching more about the topic on CNN.com I found this link that was very interesting, http://amfix.blogs.cnn.com/2009/06/22/iranian-protestor-plea/ check it out, it has a Iran College student who called CNN to explain what is actually happening over in Iran.
I still am unsure what to think regarding this election. To an American, the election of Moussavi makes sense. Therefore, anything to the contrary raises a red flag. The images of protest, oftentimes violently rebuffed by the Iranian authorities, only strengthen our suspicions. But, is there any proof that these elections, as Gerecht so confidently assumes, were “fraudulent” or “rigged?” The New York Times reported today that the election monitoring organization, the Guardian Council, has found voting discrepancies in over 50 cities. However, the discrepancies only affect three million votes. Of course, three million is three million too many, but even if all these votes go to Moussavi he would still be a distant second.
I also share Brenna Mackin’s hesitation to accept Gerecht’s opinion because his opinion is framed by a Foundation for the Defense of Democracies agenda. Surely it’s no conspiracy, but, as W.A.Williams penned, a consciousness of purpose exists.
Although statistics can be modified to say virtually anything, I found this article very interesting. http://counterpunch.com/amin06222009.html It’s subtitled, “A Hard Look at the Numbers” As I only have a modest base of information on Iran, it would be interesting to hear your comments on the article if you have time.
I am currently taking History 434 and really enjoy the readings.
Dear Andrew,
You make excellent points. The Counterpunch article addresses doubts about the extent of electoral fraud in Iran. I am not sure myself, but I am very suspicious of the ruling candidate’s 2-to-1 lead in the ballots.
More significant, the Iranian political leadership has clearly suffocated a vibrant, diverse, and even somewhat democractic civil society within the country. The election raised expectations for new openings that have remained nailed shut. The claims against the electoral outcome are claims for representation and voice. One cannot help but sympathize with those claims and embrace them cautiously as facilitators for better US-Iranian relations, I believe.
I thought both your comments and this article were very interesting. I know very little about the history or current situation in Iran so this was very enlightening. Because I am so uneducated about this topic my comments are more questions:
1) You said that Iran’s situation is difficult and unique in that they have to purge their own leadership ranks. I guess I’m a little confused as to why transformation has to come in this way and how that could even happen. Is it possible or likely that a revolutionary leader or leaders would overthrow the current regime by force? How could Moussavi come into power unless it is by force if Khamenei continues his rigged elections?
2) I am hesitant to accept everything in the article by Gerecht as it seems one-sided because he is writing on the agenda of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. I think that democracies are an amazing, wonderful form of government, however, he seems to have a both westernized and idealized view of democracies. Would it be possible for iran to have a free democracy that was not secular? Obviously it is not working right now but perhaps that is not due to the incompatibility of democracy with Islam but rather the corruption of the government and/or the interpretation of the Koran.
3)What exactly is Gerecht suggesting President Obama do? To me it seems vague and unclear.
Dear Brenna,
You ask excellent questions. I will try to answer them as best I can:
1. The Iran case shows, I think, that popular opposition is very important in pushing an authoritarian regime to confront difficult issues. Nonetheless, popular protesters rarely have the guns and money to force a change of government in the short term. Regime change occurs when individuals within the elite leadership ranks become convinced that the popular protesters have a point, and that some kind of serious political reform is needed. Protests therefore are most effective at persuasion. Political change requires change within elite leadership circles.
2. Yes, you are absolutely correct that there are many kinds of democracy. All democracies need not adopt secular assumptions. Some degree of tolerance for different views on basic issues seems necessary for democracy.
3. Gerecht is struggling with the big question. What can the US do to help reform in Iran? Strong support for the protesters will only de-legitimize them in the eyes of some Iranians. Detachment could, however, de-moralize the protesters and embolden the conservatives, as it did in China in 1989. I think the US needs to express concern and continue to support non-violent representative processes, without endorsing anyone in particular. This has generally been President Obama’s line, but it is a difficult one to walk consistently.