Geopolitics
18 December 2011
The death of North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong Il, opens a new era in East Asia. He was the absolute ruler of North Korea, appointed by the charismatic founder of the totalitarian society who most citizens viewed as a God. For all the questions about his leadership, Kim Jong Il could always rely on the fact that his father, also the father of the country, said he should rule. He had inherited legitimacy.
If history is any guide, we know that legitimacy is not easily inherited for a third generation, more distant from the charisma of the founding moment. We also know that a large proportion of the North Korean people have lived near starvation for more than a decade. Their capacity to embrace a new savior in Kim’s very young, inexperienced, and largely unknown son, Kim Jong Eun, is questionable.
North Korea seems ripe for a period of turmoil in leadership and society at large. South Korea, Japan, and China should expect more refugee movements, and perhaps some uncoordinated and provocative North Korean military maneuvers. Military leaders in Pyongyang will want to show strength as they jockey for power after Kim.
What should the United States and its allies do? How should we react? There are limitations to external leverage in North Korea, but there is also space for important foreign influence during this time of transition:
1. Show Military Strength without Provocation: South Korea, Japan, and the United States must do everything they can to discourage military adventurism by a faction in North Korea during the period of uncertainty. This means keeping forces on alert and at full strength to repulse any offensive or probing action. This also means remaining clearly in a defensive posture, with a firm statement that we do not seek a military clash. There will be unrest, and perhaps significant violence, in North Korea. It must remain contained in North Korea.
2. Engage China: Beijing is Pyongyang’s only friend, and even that relationship has frayed in recent years. The United States must work closely to assess Chinese aims, anticipate Chinese moves, and persuade China to act in ways that do not simply reinforce a dictatorship on the old model. Washington and Beijing must begin an intense dialogue about what stable change in North Korea should look like, and the two capitals must work toward that end. Support for reforms in North Korea that approximate the economic and political openings of China in the 1980s, under Deng Xiaoping, are a good place to start. The South Koreans would embrace that vision as well.
3. Speak to the North Koreans: North Korea is a closed society, but this period of transition will create some new openings. The United States and its allies must prepare to take advantage of opportunities for direct communications with people on the ground. Radio, video, and even air-dropped leaflets should convey a simple message: “We want peace with North Korea and we want to help improve the lives of the people in your country. Work with us.” In the short term, we should encourage openness, not immediate democracy. We should advocate economic assistance, not immediate capitalism.
The history of post-authoritarian transitions in other societies warns against excessive expectations. North Korea’s totalitarianism and its foreign aggressiveness will not die quickly with Kim Jong Il. North Korea will enter a period of uncertainty that might last for months and years. The United States and its allies must watch closely, they must try to exert cautious influence, and they must prepare to combine firmness with an open hand.
This is the time to offer mutually beneficial partnership. This is the time to embrace change, even as we do not control the outcomes. Instead of simple slogans, American foreign policy requires sophisticated and consistent diplomacy. Let’s hope that we can rise to the occasion.
This blog post originally appeared at http://globalbrief.ca
Posted in Blog, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, history | 
Tags: change, China, death, democracy, Japan#, Kim Jong-il, North Korea, post-authoritarian, Pyongyang, Russia, South Korea, transition, United States | 
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21 November 2011
Today it became official. This U.S. Congress is incapable of making balanced and judicious policy decisions. The failure of the specially created “supercommittee” of 12 congressional members to reach even a partial compromise on mandatory budget cuts and revenue increases is telling. Republicans and Democrats have simply decided to stop working with one another. They have forfeited all responsibility to govern. They have, therefore, forfeited all claim on the public trust. When my son asked tonight, I could not name a single Congressman or Congresswoman that I admired, trusted, or even supported strongly. Respect needs to be earned, and those in Congress have not earned it over the last year.
We have been here before. Think of the U.S. Congresses in the 1850s, the 1880s, and the 1920s. They did not establish a strong record or a broad mandate for public trust. These U.S. Congresses, like our own today, gave reason for the public to invest its support elsewhere: in the president, in the courts, in business, and in local governments. Our representatives in Washington have forced this same choice upon us. Our big national problems are not going to be solved by the incapable members of Congress; solutions will have to come from elsewhere in our society. The failure of the debt panel makes that point irrefutable.
My bet is not on the business community. My bet is not on “expert” technocrats with fancy degrees. Instead, I have faith in educated citizens who are taking matters into their own hands by starting local organizations, mobilizing people, investing in public philanthropy, and even “occupying” some of their city streets to voice their opinions. These educated citizens are using technology and social networking, intellectual study and media savvy, to shift our politics. I can feel it happening. The debt panel was the tired old politics; the local political dynamism around us is the new movement.
As with all periods of political transition, change is rough and scary. The old regime clings to power as long as it can. The new political framework is hard to see amidst all the contention and controversy. It is nonetheless there. Angry, educated citizens are more motivated to do something than ever before in recent memory. Representatives in Congress are incapable of meeting public demands. All the “special interest” money in the world will not sustain this imbalance. Expect the failure of the debt panel to mark the emerging success of something new in American politics…perhaps a renewed attention to fairness, equality, and merit-based accountability. We might even call this renewed democracy, after a year of self-defeating partisan warfare.
This blog post originally appeared at: http://globalbrief.ca
Posted in Blog, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, history | Tags: budget, Congress, cut, debt, democracy, occupy, panel, super committee, supercommittee | Comments Closed
Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-building from the Founders to Obama (Free Press/Simon & Schuster, Fall 2011)
Americans are a nation-building people, and in Liberty’s Surest Guardian, Jeremi Suri looks to America’s history to see both what it has to offer to failed states around the world and what it should avoid.
More at the book website >
Jeremi Suri is the Mack Brown Distinguished Professor for Global Leadership, History, and Public Policy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of five books on contemporary politics and foreign policy. In September 2011 he will publish a new book on the past and future of nation-building: Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama. Professor Suri's research and teaching have received numerous prizes. In 2007 Smithsonian Magazine named him one of America's "Top Young Innovators" in the Arts and Sciences. His writings appear widely in blogs and print media. Professor Suri is also a frequent public lecturer and guest on radio and television programs.