Geopolitics
21 October 2011
The death of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi is the death of a Middle East generation that dominated the decades after the Second World War. It is a death that might prove more significant than the demise of communism, the rise of China, or the spread of terrorism. Gadhafi’s murder marks a separation from a recent past that, after years of familiarity, now seems unbelievably strange. We know we are in a decisively new political space for this reason: those who just months ago seemed destined to rule have quickly disintegrated into the dustbin of history.
Gadhafi’s Generation
Gadhafi’s four decades of rule in Libya were part of a common phenomenon across the Middle East. The articulate and impassioned child of poor citizens, Gadhafi drew popular support from a potent combination of nationalist chest-beating, religious revival, and promises of managed economic development. For societies emerging from colonialism and mired in poverty, charismatic prophets like Gadhafi were intoxicating. They turned the realities of postwar despair in the Middle East into a promise of strong independent states that embraced the modernity of new technologies as they remained true to ancient faiths. Gadhafi was the postcolonial answer to foreign dependency and neo-imperialism in Libya.
Gamal Abdel Nasser anticipated this role in nearby Egypt. Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad adapted the model to Iraq and Syria. The Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s and the zealotry of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were the high tide of what observers at the time viewed as an era of Middle East militant authoritarianism. Some saw it as a new fascism with Islamic characteristics.
Gadhafi and his fellow dictators rarely cooperated and they frequently went to war with one another. They each had delusions of regional dominance. They relied on the rhetoric, symbolism, and experience of perpetual war to boost their leadership and cower their critics. Gadhafi called himself a “colonel” because he claimed to fight side-by-side with his people in battle, and he threatened to destroy anyone who chose another side.
Prophets Become Criminals
Gadhafi played this game very well. His four decades in power (well beyond the average for rulers in any period or place) prove this point. He kept numerous internal, regional, and global enemies at bay. He enriched himself, his family, and his closest supporters. He became an international celebrity who fascinated observers with his eccentric behavior and rallied suffering people with his defiance of more powerful countries, especially the United States. Most people abhorred Gadhafi, but they respected his charismatic power. That was what made him so threatening, more than just a crazy dictator from a far away place.
The Libyan dictator outlasted Nasser, Assad, Khomeini, and Hussein. He was the last of a long postwar generation. His overthrow shows that the mix of nationalism, religion, and centralized development promised by that group of leaders is no longer persuasive to people in the Middle East. The prophets of the postwar era are the criminals of the twenty-first century. That is what the “Arab Spring” is all about.
What’s Next?
What will come next? There is no clear path to democracy in Libya and other Middle East societies. There are no obvious successor figures who can mobilize their societies around a coherent vision. There is no clear program for political renewal in the region.
The societies in the Middle East are, therefore, starting over. They are being reborn. Their futures are more uncertain and open than most people realize. The possibilities for both achievement and disaster are greater than since Nasser, Gadhafi, and others first came to power.
Openness and Basic Stability
What should the international community do? Amidst such uncertainty, and the tightening constraints on available resources, there are no simple answers. Massive infusions of aid and other forms of direct intervention are impractical and probably counter-productive in present circumstances.
The best route forward is one that encourages increased openness and some basic stability in Libya and other countries. The international community should promote and even modestly fund more outlets for debate in each Middle East country about the future of the region. Maximum political participation should be a goal. The greatest diversity of opinion should be our aim. New political programs will only emerge from a process like this.
To encourage basic stability, international efforts should focus on limiting violence in the region and building local institutions for adjudication of disputes. Citizens should feel safe as they debate their future. They should believe that they are involved with a fair political process. The United States and its allies should support the rule of law, not the rule of a particular party.
Modest Nation-Building
This modest program for the Middle East after Gadhafi can have real effects. The history of nation-building over the last two centuries confirms the utility of these measures. It also reminds us that in times of political transformation, focused attention and long-term investment are the best policy. Such wisdom can indeed turn Gadhafi’s death into a true moment of rebirth for the peoples of the Middle East.
This blog post originally appeared at http://globalbrief.ca
Posted in Blog, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, history, Teaching | 
Tags: Arab Spring, Assad, authoritarianism, Egypt, fascism, Gadhafi, generation, Hussein, investment, Iran, Iraq, Khomeini, Libya, Middle East, Nasser, nation-building, patience, Qaddafi, Quadaffi, rule of law, Syria, transformation | 
4 Comments »
8 October 2011
The Middle East is experiencing a revolution as citizens in country-after-country seize control of their societies. In Tunisia and Egypt, this has meant the forced resignation of a longstanding dictatorship. In Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, it has meant armed conflict, even civil war. As with all revolutions, the final outcome is hard to predict, but we can be sure that the region will not return to circumstances of the recent past. Moderate secular rulers will not be able to cow their citizens and live off the fat of oil exports and American aid. The new leaders of the Middle East will have to show that they can serve their citizens in ways their predecessors never did.
The Role for the United States
These historical warnings, however, should not become a justification for passivity. As bad as some of the previous American efforts in the region have turned out, things have only been worse when the United States stayed away. One of the biggest problems in places like Yemen, Lebanon, and Somalia is that Washington has allowed local thugs and extremists to hijack political authority. Without American support, it is very hard for well-intentioned reformers to challenge ruthless figures who control the guns, the roads, and the oil.
Savvy and select American intervention should accompany the restraint and humility that history teaches all visitors to the Middle East. We can group the appropriate United States policies into three areas: interpersonal, intergovernmental, and intergenerational. Each includes issues that directly benefit both Americans and Middle Eastern residents. Each offers low risk and high reward. American policies require courage, vision, and some creativity—qualities that have been absent from deliberations in Washington since the beginning of the Arab Spring a year ago.
Next Steps
First, Washington should move quickly to increase the density of personal contacts between prominent citizens in the Middle East and their counterparts in the United States. This involves a vast increase in America’s understaffed civilian diplomatic presence in the region. The Middle East should become the No. 1 priority region for new ambassadors, attachés, and other representatives of the United States. We should do everything we can to learn much more about the citizens who are taking control of these societies, and we should forge deep personal relationships with them, often through informal contacts outside “official” embassy settings. Historical research shows that the trust and familiarity that come from close diplomatic relationships are much more valuable, especially during a time of transition, than policy pronouncements. The United States must invest immediately in becoming more deeply connected to the Arab street.
Second, Washington must prioritize investments in transparent and accountable political institutions. Again, the historical track record shows that spending on good governance produces more dividends than efforts at foreign-sponsored economic growth. Governance is also less expensive. The United States should work with the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, and other international bodies to create a modest “Fund for Openness” that can provide assistance and aid for the key anchors of democratic politics: a free press, a fair judiciary, and basic safety for dissidents. International peacekeepers, including a small contingent of American soldiers, should support basic security for nurturing these processes.
Third, and perhaps most important, American investments in the Middle East must look to the long-term interests of the region and the United States. The president should reject all claims about immediate “success” and argue that the United States has a generational commitment to stability, prosperity, and democracy in the Arab world. It is hard to imagine America enjoying these benefits if they are denied, as they have been for decades, in the Middle East.
The United States should push for a moratorium on most military weapons sales to the region and divert investments into secular public education. Observers have long argued that Islamic extremism has grown because madrassas and other forms of hateful indoctrination have filled the vacuum in available resources for impoverished families. The people of the region need inclusive and non-hateful alternatives. The United States and its Western allies have the educators, the experience, and the resources to help. The costs will be modest and the rewards will be transformative.
Opportunity
The Arab Spring places severe limits on American influence. History also cautions against many traditional American forms of intervention. The promise of more participatory politics in the Middle East, however, demands serious and sustained American actions—far beyond what we have seen so far. The United States has a unique opportunity to invest in the modest interpersonal, intergovernmental, and intergenerational changes that will help convert failed states into peaceful nations. More than anything else, that is the American dream.
This article originally appeared on the Daily Beast: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/10/07/arab-spring-aftermath-america-s-next-step-in-the-middle-east.html
Posted in Blog, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, history | Tags: Arab Spring, Bahrain, diplomacy, education, Egypt, Foreign Policy, generation, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, State Department, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen | 2 Comments »
Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-building from the Founders to Obama (Free Press/Simon & Schuster, Fall 2011)
Americans are a nation-building people, and in Liberty’s Surest Guardian, Jeremi Suri looks to America’s history to see both what it has to offer to failed states around the world and what it should avoid.
More at the book website >
Jeremi Suri is the Mack Brown Distinguished Professor for Global Leadership, History, and Public Policy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of five books on contemporary politics and foreign policy. In September 2011 he will publish a new book on the past and future of nation-building: Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama. Professor Suri's research and teaching have received numerous prizes. In 2007 Smithsonian Magazine named him one of America's "Top Young Innovators" in the Arts and Sciences. His writings appear widely in blogs and print media. Professor Suri is also a frequent public lecturer and guest on radio and television programs.