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The death of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi is the death of a Middle East generation that dominated the decades after the Second World War. It is a death that might prove more significant than the demise of communism, the rise of China, or the spread of terrorism. Gadhafi’s murder marks a separation from a recent past that, after years of familiarity, now seems unbelievably strange. We know we are in a decisively new political space for this reason: those who just months ago seemed destined to rule have quickly disintegrated into the dustbin of history.

 

Gadhafi’s Generation

Gadhafi’s four decades of rule in Libya were part of a common phenomenon across the Middle East. The articulate and impassioned child of poor citizens, Gadhafi drew popular support from a potent combination of nationalist chest-beating, religious revival, and promises of managed economic development. For societies emerging from colonialism and mired in poverty, charismatic prophets like Gadhafi were intoxicating. They turned the realities of postwar despair in the Middle East into a promise of strong independent states that embraced the modernity of new technologies as they remained true to ancient faiths. Gadhafi was the postcolonial answer to foreign dependency and neo-imperialism in Libya.

Gamal Abdel Nasser anticipated this role in nearby Egypt. Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad adapted the model to Iraq and Syria. The Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s and the zealotry of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were the high tide of what observers at the time viewed as an era of Middle East militant authoritarianism. Some saw it as a new fascism with Islamic characteristics.

Gadhafi and his fellow dictators rarely cooperated and they frequently went to war with one another. They each had delusions of regional dominance. They relied on the rhetoric, symbolism, and experience of perpetual war to boost their leadership and cower their critics. Gadhafi called himself a “colonel” because he claimed to fight side-by-side with his people in battle, and he threatened to destroy anyone who chose another side.

 

Prophets Become Criminals

Gadhafi played this game very well. His four decades in power (well beyond the average for rulers in any period or place) prove this point. He kept numerous internal, regional, and global enemies at bay. He enriched himself, his family, and his closest supporters. He became an international celebrity who fascinated observers with his eccentric behavior and rallied suffering people with his defiance of more powerful countries, especially the United States. Most people abhorred Gadhafi, but they respected his charismatic power. That was what made him so threatening, more than just a crazy dictator from a far away place.

The Libyan dictator outlasted Nasser, Assad, Khomeini, and Hussein. He was the last of a long postwar generation. His overthrow shows that the mix of nationalism, religion, and centralized development promised by that group of leaders is no longer persuasive to people in the Middle East. The prophets of the postwar era are the criminals of the twenty-first century. That is what the “Arab Spring” is all about.

 

What’s Next?

What will come next? There is no clear path to democracy in Libya and other Middle East societies. There are no obvious successor figures who can mobilize their societies around a coherent vision. There is no clear program for political renewal in the region.

The societies in the Middle East are, therefore, starting over. They are being reborn. Their futures are more uncertain and open than most people realize. The possibilities for both achievement and disaster are greater than since Nasser, Gadhafi, and others first came to power.

 

Openness and Basic Stability

What should the international community do? Amidst such uncertainty, and the tightening constraints on available resources, there are no simple answers. Massive infusions of aid and other forms of direct intervention are impractical and probably counter-productive in present circumstances.

The best route forward is one that encourages increased openness and some basic stability in Libya and other countries. The international community should promote and even modestly fund more outlets for debate in each Middle East country about the future of the region. Maximum political participation should be a goal. The greatest diversity of opinion should be our aim. New political programs will only emerge from a process like this.

To encourage basic stability, international efforts should focus on limiting violence in the region and building local institutions for adjudication of disputes. Citizens should feel safe as they debate their future. They should believe that they are involved with a fair political process. The United States and its allies should support the rule of law, not the rule of a particular party.

 

Modest Nation-Building

This modest program for the Middle East after Gadhafi can have real effects. The history of nation-building over the last two centuries confirms the utility of these measures. It also reminds us that in times of political transformation, focused attention and long-term investment are the best policy. Such wisdom can indeed turn Gadhafi’s death into a true moment of rebirth for the peoples of the Middle East.

 

This blog post originally appeared at http://globalbrief.ca

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Unseating a dictator is usually a difficult and violent process. That has surely been the case for the rebel forces in Libya, and their international supporters, who finally took control of Tripoli on August 22. The end of Muammar Quaddafi’s 42-year tyranny, however, is only just the beginning of an uncertain and challenging transition.

 

Historians have studied regime transitions in many countries coming out of dictatorship.  Each case is unique, but there are some similarities that are worth articulating as Libyans struggle to reform their society.

 

First, the figures who directed the revolt against the old regime are rarely the best people to lead the new government. Fighting a revolution and governing a new state are two very different tasks. Defeating an entrenched dictator requires savvy battlefield skills, some brutality, and targeted intimidation. Managing a society in transition calls for a much lighter touch, including the ability to build consensus, persuade, and flatter. The rebel hero is a militant; the governing leader must be a manager.

 

Second, foreign supporters of the new government must help, but they must also choose their moments carefully. Too little external assistance during a period of transition contributes to suffering, insecurity, and resentment among citizens. They quickly turn to demagogues who promise quick solutions, often with more violence. Too much external intervention encourages dependence, corruption, and resentment of foreigners who seem to be profiting at the cost of locals. The aid giver quickly becomes a perceived imperialist.

 

Navigating this dilemma of too little or too much assistance is not impossible. The United States and other big powers must work closely together with local figures, they must think carefully about the areas where they can help most effectively, and they must show respect for the country, the culture, and its people. External assistance should appear temporary and targeted for local needs during a period of transition. Americans and other foreigners must act as visiting guests, not aggressive know-it-alls.

 

Third, and perhaps most important, everyone involved in a regime transition must recognize that change is uneven and unpredictable. There are no formulas, laws, or simple rules for nation-building. The historical record makes that clear. Transitions succeed only when the key domestic and foreign actors articulate basic principles and work toward them, continually adapting to new circumstances and challenges. This requires frank communication, serious analysis of day-to-day events, and frequent adjustments. Creating a new government after dictatorship is an art, and it demands courageous, creative, and open-minded leaders.

 

The future for Libya is bright because the country has rich resources, many foreign supporters, and a new group of empowered figures who have unseated a terrible dictator in the name of the people. Making good on the promise of a New Libya will not be easy, but the first step is to acknowledge the difficulties and begin a conversation about identifying leaders, processes, and partners for the next few months. After all, Rome was not build in a day.

 

This essay originally appeared at:  http://www.utexas.edu/know/2011/08/25/suri_libya/

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About Jeremi Suri
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Jeremi Suri is the Mack Brown Distinguished Professor for Global Leadership, History, and Public Policy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of five books on contemporary politics and foreign policy. In September 2011 he will publish a new book on the past and future of nation-building: Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama. Professor Suri's research and teaching have received numerous prizes. In 2007 Smithsonian Magazine named him one of America's "Top Young Innovators" in the Arts and Sciences. His writings appear widely in blogs and print media. Professor Suri is also a frequent public lecturer and guest on radio and television programs.

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