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This week will mark the most important period for great power diplomacy since the Cold War. Chinese leader Hu Jintao will visit Washington D.C. for a set of intense discussions with President Barack Obama. The meetings will combine the displays of courtesy and power that made similar events so eye-catching during the heyday of U.S.-Soviet summitry. Hu and Obama will meet as the two most important men in the world. Although they both face many constraints at home, they have the ability to mobilize people and resources on an unmatched scale. Their words and actions will move markets, militaries, and millions of minds. An uncertain and anxious world is watching them as it has not watched two men since Mikhail Gorbachev visited Ronald Reagan in New York more than twenty years ago.

I must say that it feels good to uncork a little vintage diplomacy from the recent past. Summit meetings are often filled with empty rhetoric and misleading imagery, but they do serve a vital purpose. Most of all, they provide a sense of order to the world. The leaders of the two most powerful countries come together, they discuss their concerns in a civil manner, and they pledge to work together. That sets a tone for politics far from the sites of the state dinners. It also reminds onlookers that the world is not chaotic. A few powerful people can combine forces to control, or at least manage, change. Larger meetings like the G-8 or G-20 also provide some sense of global order, but in a way that is much more diffuse and fragmented. It matters enormously to see the two top dogs meeting for a peaceful and extended tete-a-tete.

Great power summits are ordering events. They are times to assess common problems and forge cooperative policies among the most powerful countries. Summits should produce ideas for joint management of problems, not radical or risky proposals. The latter will always come from below the highest peaks of power.

With this global management mission in mind, there are three big things that Hu and Obama can accomplish this week. First, they can affirm a commitment to open and expanding international trade. This requires a strong joint statement and much more. The two leaders should agree that they will work together to open their respective economies. This means a market appreciation of the Chinese currency and a fiscal reduction in American deficit spending, particularly on domestic agricultural and industrial subsidies. To date, currency controls in China and domestic subsidies in the United States have had the effect of restricting trade and raising animosities. Open trade is not a sure-fire source of international peace and growth, but it is a necessary condition for stable mutual relations among the most powerful societies. The scholarship on the topic offers overwhelming evidence for that proposition. Hu and Obama must make that a clear priority.

Second, the time has come to discuss arms control between the United States and China. Summits between American and Soviet leaders often focused on this issue, to very good effect. Washington and Beijing have huge conventional arsenals deployed in and around Northeast and Southeast Asia. In recent years, both countries have increased their naval presence in the Pacific, with more aggressive forward postures. Hu and Obama must open a dialogue about managing potential crises – like the recent events around North Korea, the seizure of a Chinese fishing boat by Japan, and the downing of an American spy plane in early 2001. A commitment to limits on aggressive behavior by both sides would send an important message to regional partners, as well as military figures within both countries.

Third, and perhaps most important, the leaders of the United States and China must make their meetings a regular occurrence. This was the great innovation of superpower detente in the 1970s. It helped to stabilize international relations for the last two decades of the Cold War. It created many openings for long-term political change. Again, the scholarship on this topic is very revealing. By committing to high-level cooperation, even friendship, Obama and Hu will encourage more of the same across business, academic, and cultural communities. They will visibly help to demystify false images of a threatening adversary. Competition will remain a major element of the U.S.-China relationship – and Washington should not apologize or ignore Chinese human rights violations and other misdeeds – but high-level relationship-building will encourage more connections for mutual benefit.

China remains an authoritarian society and a potential threat to the United States. From Beijing’s point of view, Washington remains an overgrown and self-centered bully. Great power diplomacy does not eliminate conflicts of interest and perception. It does, however, encourage a stable framework for broader and more sustained relations between big societies. In the long run, more dialogue and cooperation is in the interests of both nations – especially the one with the more open, democratic system. Ronald Reagan proved that point in his efforts to work with Mikhail Gorbachev. Barack Obama should do the same with Hu Jintao.

This blog post originally appeared at http://globalbrief.ca

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The tensions around the Korean peninsula have escalated yet again, following the release of evidence that Pyongyang ordered the March torpedo attack on a South Korean ship. In recent days, the two Koreas have cut off most relations with one another, and the North has unleashed a new series of threats. The United States has voiced strong support for its South Korean ally, and the United Nations Security Council will discuss a new resolution on sanctions against Pyongyang.

This is serious stuff. It appears that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is using his recent belligerence to build internal support for a transition in power to his youngest, and largely unknown, son. For the conservative South Korean government and the United States, a direct and unprovoked attack on a sovereign state´s naval forces, operating in international waters, demands retaliation. The North Koreans and other observers must not think they can attack the ships of other states at their whim. They also must not believe that a small nuclear capability offers protection against reprisals. Otherwise, the incentives for more attacks and more nuclear proliferation, in East Asia and other parts of the world, will only increase.

The U.S. strategy toward North Korea, from the second term of the Bush presidency through the first two Obama years, has focused on containing Pyongyang through close cooperation with regional allies, awaiting the regime´s internal collapse. This still appears wise, but also insufficient. Recent aggression reinforces the long-standing fear that Kim Jong-il is willing to immolate the entire region for the sake of prolonging his regime, or at least making its self-destruction globally devastating. Kim will not follow the path of Erich Honecker and the other East German leaders who peacefully accepted the post-communist transformation of their government in 1989.

So what else should the United States and its allies do? There are no good options, but that observation does not justify strategic inertia. Here are 3 ideas the United States should consider for a new strategy against North Korea, short of war:

1. Increase forced information penetration of North Korean society. The South Koreans recently set up new loudspeakers near the border. We could also initiate aerial leaflet drops, new radio broadcasts, and other efforts to undermine Kim Jong-il´s totalitarian control of information in his society. Even if these actions show limited results, they will raise the costs of the regime´s recent aggression for its leader. If Kim wants to remain unchallenged at home, he must limit his belligerence abroad. Otherwise, we will use our technology and other means to bring our message into his society.

2. Cut off energy supplies. North Korea is dependent on energy imports, mostly from China, to fuel its military machine. Its citizens live energy-starved lives so that the military can threaten its neighbors. Its nuclear technology supports destructive weapons rather than basic societal needs. If we want to halt the continued functioning of the North Korean military, embargoeing energy imports is a fast and easy path to that outcome. The North Koreans will surely threaten a military reprisal, but we can respond with the offer for renewed energy imports after evidence of North Korean non-belligerence. This approach does risk a North Korean decision for war, but that might be an unavoidable risk under present circumstances. An energy embargo can have real effects on North Korea and force a possible change in its policies, if the U.S. is firm and builds support for this approach in China, South Korea, and Japan. If all of these states do not immediately agree, even the threat of an energy embargo might inspire a rethinking in North Korea.

3. As much as we might not like it, the time may have come for strategic military strikes against North Korea´s nuclear facilities. We cannot allow a regime that has attacked its neighbor´s navy to follow with threats of similar unprovoked nuclear attacks. We cannot allow a regime with this record of aggression to continue loose talk of launching nuclear missiles. If this continues, Japan and South Korea will surely feel more internal pressure to develop their own nuclear capabilities, setting off a greater arms race in the region and around the world. Nothing could have worse implications for U.S. non-proliferation efforts. The North Koreans and other observers (especially in Iran) must know that their nuclear efforts will become military targets if they are coupled with aggressive moves against their neighbors. This approach might induce a North Korean act of war, but that again might be a risk worth taking. Otherwise, we have set a precedent for accepting aggression and nuclear proliferation in East Asia and other regions. The future war that is likely in this scenario is worse than anything that would come from military strikes on nascent nuclear belligerents today.

As I said earlier, none of these are good options. The present course of containment, however, appears worse as it allows North Korea to attack its enemies at whim, pay few costs, and procure concessions that prolong the regime and its threatening behavior. To break out of this vicious cycle, the U.S. and its allies should consider some difficult alternatives. Effective strategy requires exactly this kind of thinking, staring into the abyss and contemplating necessary sacrifices and lesser evils.

This blog post originally appeared at www.globalbrief.ca

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Jeremi Suri is the Mack Brown Distinguished Professor for Global Leadership, History, and Public Policy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of five books on contemporary politics and foreign policy. In September 2011 he will publish a new book on the past and future of nation-building: Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama. Professor Suri's research and teaching have received numerous prizes. In 2007 Smithsonian Magazine named him one of America's "Top Young Innovators" in the Arts and Sciences. His writings appear widely in blogs and print media. Professor Suri is also a frequent public lecturer and guest on radio and television programs.

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