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ON THE COVER
Francis Miller, Joseph Zack Kornfeder (1950) (Courtesy of Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Ex-Communist Joseph Zack Kornfeder (1898–1963) assumes the role of Chief Commissar of Mosinee, United Soviet States of America, in the American Legion–sponsored mock communist invasion of Mosinee, Wisconsin on May 1, 1950. Along with fellow ex-Communist Benjamin Gitlow, Kornfeder was hired by the Legion to make the two-day Stalinist dictatorship “realistic.” The event drew widespread media attention and was later featured in the film Atomic Café (1987). Historians have paid increasing attention to the impact of the Cold War on American culture.
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- Dialogue—A forum for historians to discuss issues related to teaching history
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- On Teaching—A discussion and analysis of various teaching strategies and activities

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Articles should be written in a style that is readable and accessible for a broad audience of high school, middle school, and college-level teachers interested in all aspects of history education, including recent scholarship in U.S. history, curriculum, and developments in educational methodology. We appreciate suggestions regarding appropriate illustrations for your article. Please include biographical information about current and former teaching positions. The OAH Magazine of History uses The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). Authors should follow the “notes and bibliography” format presented in section 16, “Documentation One.” Endnotes should be kept to a minimum. Bibliography and reference lists should follow the “Selected Bibliography” format outlined in section 16.76 of the Chicago Manual.

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D-day in Mosinee

It was six o’clock in the morning on May 1, 1950. In Mosinee, Wisconsin, a small Marathon County papermill town, Mayor Ralph Kronenwetter was still in his pajamas. Suddenly, outside of his house, a man shouted, “Come out with your hands on your head.” Five armed guards stormed inside. They grabbed the mayor, paraded him out the door, and informed him that the Council of People’s Commissioners had taken over the town. The man leading the assault was Chief Commissar Joseph Zack Kornfeder (see cover image), who declared Mosinee part of the United Soviet States of America. The communist invasion of Mosinee had begun.

It ended the next day. The brainchild of state and national leaders of the American Legion, the two-day mock communist takeover of Mosinee aimed to teach Americans the horrors of communist rule. The Legion selected May 1 to coincide with International Workers’ Day, traditionally celebrated by the communist movement worldwide. The attack also came at a propitious time in the early Cold War. In August 1949, the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic bomb. Two months later, Mao Tse-Tung’s People’s Liberation Army triumphed in China. In February 1950, less than three months before Mosinee’s D-Day, Wisconsin’s own Senator Joseph McCarthy broke onto the national scene, warning of communists in the U.S. State Department. The Legion’s timing and the invasion’s novelty combined to generate fantastic media coverage. Television networks, newsreel companies, wire services, Life magazine, Readers’ Digest, and even the Soviet TASS news agency sent reporters.

Today, Mosinee and its Cold War past have been largely forgotten, save for viewers of the chilling documentary Atomic Café (1982), which features live invasion footage, or readers of historian Richard Fried’s The Russians Are Coming! (1998), which chronicles the story in engaging detail. Even more obscure than Mosinee, however, is the man who roused the mayor out of bed that chilly morning. And yet, Joseph Kornfeder’s story has much to teach us about the history of the Cold War.

In 1950, anticommunist Kornfeder pretended to be a communist. But from 1919 to 1934, the Czech-born garment worker was a central leader of the American communist movement. In the late 1920s, he spent three years in the Soviet Union on political assignment. He married a Russian woman, who bore him a child, both of whom stayed in the U.S.S.R. while he organized for the Communist International in Latin America in the early 1930s. On the eve of the Mosinee invasion, the American Legion hired Kornfeder, along with former American communist leader Benjamin Gillow, as a “technical advisor” who could make the reenactment “authentic.” In the context of the articles in this issue, Kornfeder’s evolving identity raises a fundamental question that emerges in a multitude of ways when we teach about the Cold War: what exactly is a communist?

One could easily begin with George Orwell, the man who coined the term “Cold War,” as Jeremi Suri points out in his Foreword. Known widely as an “anti-communist” for his novels Animal Farm (1945) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), Orwell was, at the same time, a socialist and no friend of capitalism. When fascist Francisco Franco launched a revolt against the legally elected left-leaning government of Spain in 1936, Orwell traveled there and fought fascists by joining a socialist militia organized by the Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification (POUM). As he relates in Homage to Catalonia (1938), however, Orwell was deeply disturbed by the policies of the official Communist Party of Spain, which launched murderous attacks on socialists and anarchists, supposedly allies in the fight against fascism. Orwell retained his hopes that workers could one day run society, but he turned against Stalinism for good. Similarly, when Kornfeder left the American Communist Party in 1934, disgusted with its tame Popular Front politics, he briefly joined the Workers Party, made up of Trotskyists and followers of radical labor cleric A. J. Muste. He paid for his betrayal of Stalin. In 1937, his wife, still in the Soviet Union, was arrested in the Stalinist purges and was never heard from again. Two years later, Kornfeder made the first of several appearances as a friendly witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC).

During the postwar era, the question of who was a communist went beyond the issue of organizational membership. As Jeff Woods’ article indicates, advocacy of racial integration could transform anyone, black or white, into a communist in the eyes of the segregationist public. In her exploration of children and the Cold War, Donna Alvah reveals that the fear of “the misery that might lure desperate people to communism.” My piece on Salt of the Earth (1954), a film that documented a New Mexico zinc miners’ strike, suggests how ordinary Mexican American workers and their family members, few of them members of the Communist Party, came to be seen as tools of the Kremlin. In Mitchell Lerner’s article on presidential tapes, we hear President Richard Nixon conspiring with Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to infiltrate the anti–Vietnam War movement with their own stereotype of political subversives—“long-haired, dirty-looking bastards.”

For many Americans, the identity of communists during the Cold War clearly revolved around a military threat. In his teaching strategy about the declassified Venona documents, Paul Frazier focuses on decoded messages tying atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and their complicity in sharing nuclear secrets with the Soviet Union. John DeRose uses a photograph of a Nike antiaircraft missile base located near downtown Milwaukee to teach students about the Cold War military presence at home. The opening illustration for Marc Silverstone’s survey of anticommunist historiography provides a colorful, nightmarish vision of the Soviets as zombie-like killers. His article summarizes the evolution of literature on the Cold War since the OAH Magazine of History last covered the topic in 1994, including the literature on Cold War pageantry from Manhattan to Mosinee. While the 1950 Mosinee invaders fired no guns, there were two casualties. On day two, the mayor fell ill, suffered a cerebral hemmorhage, and died on May 6. A minister who was “arrested” died from a heart attack on May 7. Joseph Zack Kornfeder worked as a professional anticommunist for another thirteen years. In 1963, at the age of sixty-five, he checked into a Washington, D.C. hotel, had a heart attack, and died. It was May Day.

Sad to say, there is one contributor to this issue of the OAH Magazine of History who will not read his article in print. Longtime OAH member David Ghere, author of the teaching strategy on the Yalta Conference, passed away earlier this year. Please see the bio and tribute written by his former colleague David Arendale, whom we thank for helping prepare the article for publication. We salute all of the authors and consulting editor Jeremi Suri for their excellent work on this issue.

—Carl R. Weinberg
A new interpretation for a new generation

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James A. Henretta, University of Maryland
Rebecca Edwards, Vassar College
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“A Peace that is No Peace”: The Cold War as Contemporary History

Jeremi Suri

In October 1945, George Orwell warned that “the drift for many decades has been not towards anarchy but towards the reimposition of slavery. We may be heading not for general breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the slave empires of antiquity.” Orwell foresaw how the emergence of two superpowers on the ashes of fascism, the deployment of new destructive technologies, and the manipulation of terror would deprive the postwar world of many promised freedoms. The second half of the twentieth century would be frozen, Orwell predicted, in “a peace that is no peace,” when war preparation, controlled conflict, and targeted repression became “normal.” The British journalist famously labeled his global diagnosis “a permanent state of cold war” (1).

Although many contemporary observers did not share Orwell’s dark vision, they adopted his terminology. The Cold War was an era of proliferating conflict short of total war. During the decades after 1945, virtually every corner of the globe was enveloped in competition, intervention, and violence due to a clash of two world systems: liberal capitalism and authoritarian communism. The United States and the Soviet Union were the self-conscious embodiments of these respective systems, and they built alliances of similar states and prepared to contain, attract, and, if necessary, destroy their adversaries. Both Washington and Moscow defended their long-term security and prosperity by spreading their “ways of life,” and undermining alternatives. The superpowers managed to avoid World War III, but they employed almost every mode of competition short of Armageddon (2).

Yet many of the most significant developments after 1945 reflected dynamics that preceded the Cold War. The break-up of the European overseas empires, for example, followed the identity formation, institution-building, and organized resistances that emerged in the early twentieth century to challenge imperialist power. Decolonization would have occurred even if there had been no Cold War. The same could be said for other vectors of change, including movements for racial and gender equality, the growth of welfare states, rapid environmental degradation, and the political-economic transformation of post-industrial nations. The Cold War was not the universal driver of global change (3).

The historical antecedents of the late twentieth century, however, do not detract from the overwhelming importance of the Cold War to the decades after 1945. The Cold War was not the source of all change, but it inflected global trends in new and enduring directions. In particular, capitalist-communist rivalries forced activists with different interests to choose sides, and directly affected the growth of developing nations. The Cold War offered an enticing source of foreign funding for local actors, it threatened those who failed to find a superpower patron, and it encouraged domestic reforms that followed American or Soviet models. By the 1960s, the politics, economies, and cultures of nearly all “third world” societies reflected the growing influence of the superpowers. To be “modern,” in this context, meant to be part of what one scholar called a “Global Cold War” (4).

This perspective defines the Cold War as much more than a collection of events, policies, ideas, and discourses. It was, most profoundly, a logic of practice—a set of social and political norms made and unmade in everyday behavior. Practitioners of policy worked within the fears and opportunities of the Cold War world. Critics who challenged these fears and opportunities deployed many of the same ideas and images to argue for alterations in policy. During the 1960s, for example, the often violent debates between “Cold Warriors” and “New Left” activists centered on how to fight a more ethical and effective Cold War, not how to create a new system. The Cold War brought diverse groups together in support and in opposition to dominant policies. As Orwell predicted, the end of the Second World War narrowed the range of political and social creativity across the globe and at home (5).

The Cold War ended at the close of the twentieth century without real victory. The system simply collapsed when it had, quite literally, spent itself into oblivion. None of the largest and most powerful actors, especially the Soviet Union, could continue to shoulder the burden of arms, expenditures, and near ceaseless expansion required by the obsessive conflict of capitalism versus communism. The personalities and policies of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan mattered enormously, but these men acted in a context of systemic decline. The Cold War had a lifecycle that leaders and citizens struggled to understand. It ended as it began: with a shift in geopolitical power and a new set of alliances and rivalries among peoples and states (6).

The “peace that was no peace” did not last forever. Our successor world of fragmentary politics, economic insolvency, and proliferating
violence has a new logic that draws on this recent past, but it is also very different. If 1945 brought repressive stalemate, 2001 brought militaristic freedom. In comparison to the present “Global War on Terror,” perhaps Orwell’s dark vision was not as terrifying as many readers at the time believed. Perhaps present fears of terrorism are not as apocalyptic as the Cold War, especially when juxtaposed with the memories of a now departed era of mutually assured nuclear destruction.

Rethinking the Cold War

The articles in this issue address these precise issues of memory, perspective, and vision. Marc Selverstone analyzes the origins of American anticommunism by describing the intellectual and cultural roots of Cold War thinking in the United States, particularly during the partisan debates of the 1930s and 1940s. He shows that anticommunism reflected a broad and deep-seated set of ideas, rooted in the Great Depression—the greatest twentieth-century crisis of capitalism. Anticommunism, Selverstone argues, was much more than a knee-jerk reaction to postwar Soviet power. It was a sophisticated assessment of liberal-capitalist vulnerabilities and the attraction of dangerous alternatives.

Jeffrey Woods situates many of Selverstone’s arguments in the American South, examining how anticommunist ideas fused with race hatred to repress African American freedoms. Drawing on some exciting new research, Woods also shows how numerous activists—including Anne Braden and Robert Williams—challenged anticommunist racism in radical, creative, and powerful ways. The civil rights movement was a struggle against the curious Cold War fusion of racial prejudice and political intolerance, but it also drew on the Cold War rhetoric of freedom and equality to justify activism against pervasive domestic abuses in the name of anticommunism.

Donna Alvah connects the Cold War narrative to the lives of children. She explains the challenges and opportunities of research in this area, and she focuses on a number of fascinating issues. Alvah addresses the role of military culture on childhood experiences, especially near armed facilities. She analyzes the experiences of American parents and children residing in non-American societies, as well as the presence of adopted children from abroad within the United States. Her discussion of Jean Louise and Captain Lauren Elkin, stationed in Japan during the 1950s, captures how new friendships formed across cultures in the shadow of the Cold War. Despite obvious disparities in power, enduring influences on language, behavior, and social outlook traveled in multiple directions, even in partially occupied societies. Alvah inspires readers to think about how changes in daily family and school routines brought the Cold War deeply into family life.

Mitchell Lerner moves from the family to Haggar pants. His article mines the fascinating presidential audio recordings from the Cold War period, opening with a humorous reflection on President Lyndon Johnson’s somewhat uncouth manipulation of power. Lerner’s piece reminds teachers and historians that the analytical divisions we create between units on the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement was a struggle against the curious Cold War fusion of racial prejudice and political intolerance, but it also drew on the Cold War rhetoric of freedom and equality to justify activism against pervasive domestic abuses in the name of anticommunism.

Student simulation for the February 1945 Yalta Conference that set the stage for the Cold War. Paul Frazier suggests a very stimulating model for introducing students to the newly released Venona documents on espionage, treachery, and the enduring controversies surrounding these thorny issues. Carl Weinberg showcases how a close reading of a film, Salt of the Earth (1954), can provide students with insights about labor strife, popular culture, and McCarthyism. John DeRose incorporates material culture—a photograph of a Nike missile site in Milwaukee—to give students a feeling for how big international rivalries affected local life far from traditional battlefields. These are filled with valuable suggestions for making the Cold War a source of creativity and increased student interest in history.

For all the troubles of our contemporary world, we are, thankfully, far from George Orwell’s time. Our challenges with foreign wars and domestic depriations are different, but they continue to draw on the experiences and lessons of this recent past. Although new research and teaching on the Cold War will not chart a bright new future by themselves, they will help us understand better how we have come to where we are. We can only imagine new possibilities by studying those now lost to the past.

Endnotes


Jeremi Suri is the E. Gordon Fox Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he directs the European Union Center of Excellence and the Grand Strategy Program. He is author of four books on contemporary politics and foreign policy, most recently, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Harvard University Press, 2007). In 2007 Smithsonian Magazine named Professor Suri one of America’s “Top Young Innovators” in the Arts and Sciences.)
A Literature So Immense: The Historiography of Anticommunism

Marc J. Selverstone

In 1982, historian Maurice Isserman published *Which Side Were You On?*, a study of the American Communist Party and its fight against fascism from the 1930s through the end of the Second World War (1). As its title suggests, the book chronicled an era in which one was either pro- or antifascist—supportive of progressive forces backing the Soviet Union in resisting the Nazi menace, or complicit in paving the way for Hitler’s rise and aggression. Communists and fellow travelers took the lead in aiding Moscow’s effort, but Americans of all stripes eventually joined in the fight against, and ultimate victory over, Nazism. The blessings of the ensuing peace were short-lived, however. Within two years of Germany’s defeat, the United States had become mobilized in an effort to turn back a global challenge emanating from the Kremlin. By the fall of 1947, this new reality—this “cold war” with the Soviet Union—had come to define much of American public and political life.

As they took to the barricades during the late 1940s and early 1950s, Americans were once again asking which side their fellow citizens were on. With communists avowing their fealty not to the nation but to an international working class—if not to the Soviet Union itself—the public came to treat them as “the enemy within,” a force that many regarded as a conspiratorial, secretive, and likely treasonous cabal that sought to undermine American institutions and interests. That anticommunist impulse suffused the nation’s political culture for much of the next decade and beyond, cutting across a wide swath of American society and rousing citizens to combat the “Red Menace” (2).

During these postwar years, serious study of American anticommunism emerged alongside an analogous effort to understand American communism, as literature on one came to influence writing on the other (3). A central theme in both historiographies was the question of patriotic allegiance. Should American communists be regarded as the handmaiden of Soviet policy and thus a threat to the United States? Or should they be treated as a leading force for social, economic, and political change at home? An initial group of “traditionalist” historians, writing during the 1950s to mid-1960s, believed it to be the former and treated the American Communist Party largely as an adjunct of the Soviet Union (4). They rejected the legitimacy of the party on the grounds that Communists sought ultimately to subvert the very institutions which sanctioned their participation, as well as that of all other parties, in the American political process. A second wave of “revisionist” scholars, writing during the late 1960s and mid-1970s, focused not on American communists but on those who opposed them. These historians charged that the Red-hunting associated with Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy from Wisconsin, and fostered by the Cold War liberalism of the Truman administration and its allies, was all out of proportion to the role and impact of communists in American life (5).

This debate over the virtues and vices of anticommunism, which persists to the present day, generated new questions about the movement and paved the way for a rich and expanding literature. Many of these concerned matters of origin and implementation: where did anticommunism come from? Was it rooted in a grassroots brand of populism? Did it emerge primarily from political partisanship? Was it manufactured and orchestrated by social, business, and political elites? And were particular interest groups more vigorous than others in their adoption of an anticommunist agenda?
Historians sought to answer these questions during a third period of writing on the subject that stretched from the late 1970s through the early 1990s, producing monographic studies on discreet topics that often looked at the activities of rank-and-file Communists rather than at the machinations of party leaders and their ties to Moscow. While this phase featured "traditionalist" as well as "revisionist" accounts, many of these works offered critical treatments of anticommunism and its relationship both to the conservative tilt in American politics and the renewed hawkishness of U.S. Cold War policies (6). A subsequent fourth wave of writing on communism and anticommunism, which continues to color scholarship on both topics, has taken its cues from the end of the Cold War. While much of this literature treats American anticommunism as a multifaceted movement that drew its strength from citizens of diverse backgrounds, the opening of previously closed archives in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Asia has had a powerful impact on the literature, casting new light on the relationship of American Communists to the Kremlin, including the extent of the party’s role in facilitating Soviet espionage. The implosion of the Soviet empire has thus encouraged historians to discern a moral component in the communist and anticommunist projects.

**Morality and the Anticommunist Impulse**

Accordingly, scholarship since the end of the Cold War has included studies which charge that the actions of anticommunists damaged American liberties and traditions, as well as work that, while shunning the excesses of McCarthyism, offers a more sympathetic survey of the movement. Among the latter is Richard Gid Powers’s *Not Without Honor* (1993), a comprehensive account of the anticommunist impulse. According to Powers, “there were many American anticommunists,” with adherents defying categorization by race, religion, and gender. Likewise, Powers notes that anticommunists straddled the lines between representatives of labor and management, between Democrats and Republicans, and between old-stock Americans and newly arrived immigrants (7). In a similar vein, historian John Earl Haynes, author of *Red Scare or Red Menace?* (1996), stresses the often competing agendas of anticommunist groups, noting that anticommunists were linked more by what they opposed than by what they supported. Theirs was a generally noble cause, Haynes contends, especially given the avowed aims of those they confronted. While noting the “sporadic ugliness, excesses, and silliness” of early postwar anticommunism, Haynes treats the reflex as “an understandable and rational response to a real danger to American democracy” (8).

This effort to disaggregate the various anticommunisms, a feature of traditionalist writing on the topic, has served to distinguish the impulse from its more pejorative association with McCarthyism. In the wake of Senator McCarthy’s February 1950 charge that members of the U.S. State Department had engaged in activities tantamount to treason, “McCarthyism,” a term coined by political cartoonist Herbert Block, became a mark of opprobrium. From that point forward, it stood for the seemingly indiscriminate and reckless accusations leveled at current or former members of the Communist Party, or at individuals who sympathetic with party causes (9). As many scholars and anticommunists themselves argued both then and later, McCarthy was probably the worst thing that could have happened to anticommunism. “McCarthy’s ideas do scant justice to the case against communism,” Powers writes, for anticommunism was not the same as anticommunist extremism (10).

Nevertheless, scholars have detected in McCarthyism a more generalized wave of repression directed against those who simply held unpopular views and who were harassed and sometimes fired from their jobs, often without actual cause. Historian Ellen Schrecker, for instance, locates the essence of McCarthyism in this more sweep-}

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**Portraits of Anticommunism**

Scholars have been writing about anticommunism with increasing detail, however, and biography remains a favored genre for exploring its origins, impact, and meaning. Revisionists have generally set their sights on conservative figures, and it is McCarthy himself who has received the most attention. Several studies of the man and his era have emerged in recent years, building upon standard accounts such as Robert Griffith’s *The Politics of Fear* (1987), Thomas C. Reeves’s *The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy* (1982), Richard Fried’s *Nightmare in Red* (1990), and David Oshinsky’s *A Conspiracy So Immense* (2005), each of which seeks to place McCarthy within the broader political, social, and cultural trends that spawned his politics (13). Jeff Broadwater, for instance, finds that while President Dwight D. Eisenhower distanced himself from McCarthy, Ike nevertheless inflated the communist threat in similar ways and trampled over civil liberties in the process. Ted Morgan’s *Reds: A History of McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America* (2003) picks up where Schrecker’s work leaves off, recounting McCarthyite activity long before, and well after, its actual practice at the hands of the Wisconsin senator (14). Yet McCarthy also has his defenders, and not just among the punditocracy (15). Arthur Herman finds McCarthy an admirable figure, unjustly smeared by a coterie of leftists—a perspective, it should be noted, that remains unpopular among revisionist and traditionalist scholars alike (16).

But McCarthy is no more a stand-in for conservative anticommunism than for anticommunism writ large, as several recent volumes can attest. Sam Tanenhaus’s biography of Whittaker Chambers, Michael Ybarra’s portrayal of Nevada’s Democratic senator Pat McCarran, Lou Cannon’s work on Ronald Reagan, Linda Bridges’s and John Coyne’s study of conservative intellectual William F. Buckley, Jr., several studies of the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover, and three recent portraits of conservative guru Ayn Rand have complicated the portrait of the right-wing anticommunist. These figures cut across ethnic, religious, class, and party lines, possessing varying degrees of education and acculturation (17).
Liberal anticommunism has also received renewed attention of late, a development likely ignited or at least accelerated by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Peter Beinart’s *The Good Fight* (2006), Kevin Mattson’s *When America Was Great* (2004), and David Cieply’s *Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism* (2006), along with several articles and dissertations, chronicle efforts by Cold War liberals and Democrats to claim the mantle of anticommunism from conservatives and Republicans, while promoting a political agenda that targeted toward economic and social justice. Much of this literature harkens back to Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s 1949 volume, *The Vital Center*, a seminal treatise of the non-communist Left, which rejected both the conservative politics of the early postwar era as well as the more accommodationist policies of Henry Wallace and the Progressive Citizens of America.

**Anticommunism in the Public and Private Spheres**

Beyond surveys of the anticommunist impulse and its ideological offshoots, several works focus on the broader expression of anticommunism by delving into the public and private experiences of Americans at midcentury. Among these are studies which probe the cultural dimension of anticommunist sentiment. Two of the more noteworthy are Stephen Whitfield’s *The Culture of the Cold War* (1991) and Richard Fried’s *The Russians Are Coming!* (1998), both of which explore anticommunism among media outlets, religious figures, and the “professional” anticommunists who testified against their former comrades. Fried, in particular, depicts the pageantry and spectacle of anticommunist expression in the public arena, including the episode in which the citizen of Mosinee, Wisconsin, with the aid of local and national organizations, put themselves under the yoke of a Stalinist dictatorship to illustrate the horrors of communist rule (19). Other surveys of that culture, both highbrow and low, come from David Caute, who captures the Cold War struggles over artistic expression in Europe and the United States, and Cynthia Hendershot, who notes that the popular depiction of anticommunism both terrified and amused American audiences. For readers interested in the specific contributions of television to anticommunist sentiment, Thomas Doherty’s *Cold War, Cool Medium* portrays the “boob tube” as moderating the more fevered campaigns of American anticommunists, helping to move that reflex toward the nation’s political center (20).

The creation and projection of anticommunist fervor constitutes yet another dimension of writing on this topic. My own *Constructing the Monolith* (2009) addresses this development by charting the formation of the Communist image in both the United States and Great Britain, while Benjamin Alpers’s *Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture* (2003) examines its manifestations in U.S. popular culture, focusing on media channels such as movies, radio, novels, and comic books. Along with Michaela Hoenicke Moore’s, *Know Your Enemy* (2009), these books trace the emergence of the enemy image and shed light on the varieties of anticommunism (and antinazism) coursing through the United States at midcentury (21).

These developments and expressions were national in scope, but they took root in small towns and big cities alike, a phenomenon that has generated fresh interest among historians of anticommunism. M.J. Heale’s *McCarthy’s Americans* (1998), for example, explores “Red Scare politics” in Michigan, Massachusetts, and Georgia, while Philip Jenkins’s *The Cold War at Home* (1999) offers a monograph of the same focusing on Pennsylvania. These state-based studies note that anticommunism on the grassroots level often intersected with labor, religious, and ethnic communities, as well as with issues closer to home, replicating on a regional or community level what was happening within the country at large. Both Heale and Jenkins also note that these localized anticommunist campaigns were animated by a rejection of the New Deal as much as by concerns about actual communist subversion (22).

One of the more vibrant subfields of the literature involves the intersection of anticommunism, sexuality, and gender. Among the most illuminating of these works is David Johnson’s *The Lavender Scare* (2004), which captures the process by which fears about national security merged with concerns about sexuality and the family in ways that rendered homosexuals as security risks. During the height of the Cold War, in fact, far more individuals were dismissed from government positions on account of their sexuality than for their political beliefs or affiliations (23). Manliness and the perceived deficiency thereof—themes that run through the anticommunist campaign against gays in government—are at the core of related works by Robert Dean and K.A. Cuordileone (24). These concerns also informed efforts to promote the nuclear family as the bedrock of an anticommunist society, a project that was equally steeped in the preservation of traditional gender roles. Where Elaine Tyler May’s...
pioneering *Homeward Bound* (1988) once situated the foundation of the Cold War ethic in the private sphere of the American household. More recent studies, such as Mary Brennan’s on American conservative women and Donald Critchlow’s on Phyllis Schlafly, have focused on the public roles women played in the anticommunist crusade (25).

While the gay and women’s liberation movements emerged most forcefully in the national consciousness during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the push to achieve African American civil rights became a more pressing public matter during the height of the Cold War and the heyday of the anticommunist consensus. Civil rights workers were on the front lines of a movement that sought to upend the prevailing social order, particularly in the American south, and were often labeled as dupes or active agents of the Communist Party. As such, they regularly incurred the wrath of anticommunist forces. Several studies have explored the anticommunist politics of white southerners in their effort to uphold segregation. Jeff Woods’s *Black Struggle, Red Scare* (2004) and George Lewis’s *The White South and the Red Menace* (2004), the two works that engage the issue most recently and directly, chronicle the political opportunism and cynicism at work in tarring those working for civil rights with the red brush (26).

**Conclusion**

The breadth and depth of this literature—neither of which an essay of this length can hope to fully capture—highlight the challenges of teaching about anticommunism. Educators might begin with Ellen Schrecker’s *The Age of McCarthyism*, a particularly useful text since it offers a focused essay on the era, as well as dozens of primary source documents with accompanying scene-setters (27). The Powers, Haynes, Heale, and Schrecker overviews, which contextualize the movement and its expression from a range of historical and ideological perspectives, are equally valuable. Michael Barson’s *Better Dead Than Red and Red Scared!* non-scholarly works that do little more than lampoon the efforts of anticommunists, nevertheless provide images from the era, including pamphlets, bubble-gum cards, and movie placards, dramatizing the many visual representations of the anticommunist impulse (28).

Perhaps the most accessible route for students to understand the movement is through the medium of biography, in which the “reconversion narrative” provides several excellent examples. Featuring vignettes of former disciples recounting their attraction to communism or their entrance into the party before repudiating their pasts, essays such as those found in *The God That Failed* humanize these traumatic experiences and situate them historically in ways that third-person accounts cannot adequately convey. While studies of the “professional anticommunists” who testified before congressional and state committees offer their own windows into the reconversion experience, the writings of literary figures such as Arthur Koestler, Richard Wright, and Stephen Spender are invaluable portraits of an era. They help to illustrate why the mid-century encounters with communism and anticommunism mattered so much to so many and why the question of which side Americans were on continues to stoke the passions of scholars today (29).

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**Endnotes**


3. Virtually all published work on communism and anticommunism is accessible via John Earl Haynes’s massive and invaluable “American Communism and anticommunism is accessible via John Earl Haynes’s massive and invaluable Anticommunism: A Historian’s Bibliography and Guide to the Literature,” an online resource that covers a multitude of topics, themes, and methodological approaches to the field, available at <http://www.johnearlhaynes.org/page34.html>


27. Marc J. Silverstone is associate professor at the University of Virginia and assistant director for presidential studies at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, where he coordinates its “Digital Classroom Initiative” and transcribes and annotates the White House tapes of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. His Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945–1950 (Harvard University Press, 2009), won the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in 2010.
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The Cold War and the Struggle for Civil Rights

As a child I remember playing a fun game with pictures of animals printed on divided pieces of cardboard. Each half had either a head or a tail, and the object was to match upper and lower halves to form complete animals. Of course, matching familiar categories was not nearly as fun or satisfying as mixing the cards to create new and weird creatures—a giraffe with a rhino, a lion with a lizard, a seal with a swallow. Growing numbers of historians have been having this kind of fun in their work. They have taken traditionally isolated categories of study and combined them into mash-ups of theory and content. In the process, the lines between domestic and foreign, social and political, top-down and bottom-up have been blurred.

Nowhere has this been more evident than in the combination of Cold War and civil rights studies. Following the customary subdivisions of the craft, Cold War and civil rights histories developed, for the most part, in isolation from one another, but several books, some dating back to the 1950s, have sought to examine their substantial interconnections and interdependence. Cold War and civil rights struggles, these works reveal, shared not only a place and time, but also mutually reinforcing ideological and political contexts. Between them were curious mixes of racism, capitalism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, imperialism, altruism, socialism, humanitarianism, realism, and idealism that defined the complex American identity of the late twentieth century. The combination of these histories exposes the United States at the end of World War II as both a powerful and profoundly insecure nation in ways that independent Cold War and civil rights studies have not.

Early Accounts
While the scholarship unifying Cold War and civil rights histories blossomed in the 1980s, the crossover victims of segregation and the second Red Scare were writing about their plight as early as the 1950s. Anne Braden, a leftist civil rights activist working with the Southern Conference Education Fund, for example, published her book *The Wall Between* in 1958. The book tells the story of how Anne and her husband Carl ran afoul of segregationist anticommunists when they helped a black couple find a house in a white neighborhood of Louisville, Kentucky in 1954. After white supremacists bombed the home that the Bradens had sold to the couple, state prosecutors shockingly charged Carl and Anne with staging the event as part of a Communist publicity stunt. Carl Braden, who during the trial admitted to an interest in socialism but no affiliation with the Communist Party, was convicted of violating state anti-sedition laws and sentenced to eight months in prison (1).

Memoirs of other activists caught in this Red-and-black Scare surfaced through the 1970s, but academics gave the connections between domestic anticommunism and the civil rights struggle only passing attention (2). The only scholar in the 1950s and early 1960s who seriously attempted to bring the domestic Red Scare and civil rights histories together was sociologist Wilson Record. His books *The Negro and the Communist Party (1951)* and *Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict (1964)* were both essentially reactions to charges made by politicians and high-ranking government officials, who claimed that the emerging black direct-action protests were a Communist plot. Record showed that despite the repeated efforts of the Communist Party (CPUSA) to recruit African Americans, the group had largely failed. Communists might have helped in efforts to break patterns of racial discrimination, but, Record argues, African Americans and groups aiding their cause were far too invested in free-enterprise traditions to embrace Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Indeed, the largest and arguably most influential group working for black civil rights in the United States in the 1950s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), was openly anticommunist. In 1950, it even officially adopted a resolution that allowed its central office to expel any local branch that the national board of directors determined to be under communist control (3).
Black Marxists and Leftists

Record’s books began a small but steady trickle of works on the pre–World War II convergence of racism, nativism, and anticommunism in the United States, but it was not until the 1980s that the post–World War II black and Red relationship emerged more prominently as a unified topic of study (4). Cedric Robinson’s _Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition_ (1983) introduced a significant revision of Record’s thesis. Robinson and his ilk saw the civil rights movement as deeply influenced and aided by Marxism. Robinson describes a history of “racial capitalism” inherited by the United States from Europe that combined white racism, nationalism, and economic exploitation. Black Marxists, he claims, were at the forefront in confronting the inextricable links between racial and economic oppression. Gerald Horne built on this foundation in his books _Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944–1963_ (1986), and _Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946–1956_ (1988). In these works, Horne highlights the role of black leftists in opposing both segregation and McCarthy-era red-baiting. His protagonists are constantly harassed by the anticommunist national security state for attempting to subvert the government. But rather than portraying them as violent revolutionaries, the author emphasizes how effectively they worked within the liberal capitalist system for their causes (5).

Horne’s account of Ben Davis’s experiences as a black Communist working for civil rights in _Black Liberation/Red Scare: Ben Davis and the Communist Party_ (1994) offers a case study of the importance of black Communists in early civil rights causes, and the persecution they suffered as a result. Davis was a Harvard Law School graduate hired by the Communist-led International Labor Defense to help defend Angelo Herndon in Atlanta in 1933. Herndon was an African American Communist organizer who had been arrested under a state conspiracy statute that dated back to the time of slave insurrections; he lost at trial and was sentenced to twenty years on a chain gang. The case radicalized Davis, who joined the Communist Party and continued to devote his legal career to black civil rights cases, including, most famously, the Scottsboro Boys trial which delivered death sentences to eight black boys accused of raping two white women on a train in northern Alabama. Davis eventually moved to Harlem, where he helped found the Negro National Congress—a group primarily concerned with promoting racial equality—and ran for the New York City Council. He was elected to the council in both 1943 and 1947 on a Communist Party ticket, but as the Cold War quickened, his political affiliations came under suspicion. In 1949, Davis was among a small group of people convicted under the Smith Act, which made it a federal crime to advocate the overthrow of the United States government.

At the same time Horne was publishing his Cold War/civil rights studies, a series of books were released focusing on J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s ruthless pursuit of Martin Luther King, Jr. Based on a raft of Freedom of Information Act releases, Kenneth O’Reilly’s two books, _Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace_ (1983) and _“Racial Matters”: The FBI’s Secret File on Black America, 1960–1972_ (1989); Richard Gid Powers’ _Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover_ (1986); David Garrow’s _Bearing the Cross_ (1986); and Michael Friendly and David Gallen’s _Martin Luther King, Jr.: The FBI File_ (1993) probe the depths of Hoover’s obsession with King’s alleged ties to the Communist Party. Hoover was among the most powerful and obsessive investigators of Communist influence among African Americans in the nation’s history. Under his directorship, the FBI wasted decades wiretapping King’s home and offices in an attempt to uncover the civil rights leader’s collusion with Communists. The products of their effort were reports that King had maintained a friendship with at least one card carrying Communist and had hired another as an SCLC secretary. King had also been involved in several extra-marital affairs, which William Sullivan, an officer in the top tier of the FBI hierarchy in charge of investigating King and a man many thought would one day succeed Hoover as director, insisted that affairs exposed King as a “fraid, demagogue, and a scoundrel.” Yet after several years working on the case, Sullivan concluded in a letter to Hoover that Communist plots in the civil rights movement were negligible at best, and FBI resources could be better spent elsewhere. After reading the letter, Hoover fired him (6).

Post–Cold War Studies

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the emergence of a post–Cold War, post–civil rights generation of scholars grew the number of red and black studies in the 1990s. Links between the domestic anticommunist scare and the civil rights movement figured prominently, for example, in Linda Reed’s _Simple Decency and Common Sense_ (1991), Manning Marable’s _Race, Reform, and Rebellion_ (1991), Glen Jeansonne’s, Leander Perez: _Bos of the Delta_ (1995), Earl Ofari Hutchinson’s _Blacks and Reds: Race and Class in Conflict, 1910–1990_ (1995), John Glen’s _Highlander: No Ordinary School_ (1996), and William Billingsly’s _Communists on Campus: Race, Politics, and the Public University in Sixties North Carolina_ (1999), as well as many others (7).
Among the most acclaimed of these works was Timothy Tyson's *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (1999). In this study, Tyson examines the life of Robert F. Williams, a World War II veteran turned NAACP activist who argued that armed self-defense was the right of all African Americans threatened with segregationist violence and injustice. In 1958, North Carolina's “kissing case” propelled Williams to national and international attention. The case involved the imprisonment of two young black boys caught playing a kissing game with a young white girl. Williams' publicity campaign to have the boys freed drew the support of, among others, the international Communist press. The North Carolina governor's office pounced on the association, calling William's campaign a “Communist-directed front.” When the national NAACP decided to distance itself from William's efforts for fear it would be identified with communism and armed self-defense, Williams radicalized, moved to Cuba, and began broadcasting his “Radio Free Dixie” program into the United States, calling for an armed Marxist revolution of American blacks (8).

National interest in liberty and security studies grew significantly after 9/11 and with it Cold War/civil rights studies. Historians of the United States South joined the fray, examining the convergence of segregation and anticommunism as a southern phenomenon. George Lewis's *The White South and the Red Menace: Segregationist Anticommunism and Massive Resistance, 1945–1965* (2004) and my own book *Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anticommunism in the South, 1948–1968* (2004), argue that southern segregationist movement, despite the fact that it uncovered few communists, found no legitimate plots to overthrow the government, and failed to garner enough national concern to derail civil rights reform. The books also demonstrate that in launching myriad state and federal investigations, southerners ranged in purpose from those with genuine concerns over social and political change brought by leftist/integrationist collusion, to those blatantly exploiting exaggerated McCarthyite fears for the maintenance of white supremacy.

Among the most notorious and reckless of the southern Red-and-black-baiters was James Eastland. From Sunflower County, Mississippi, “Massa Jim”—as local blacks still called him through the 1960s— was a lawyer and plantation owner turned United States senator. By 1956 Eastland had risen to take over the chairmanship of the U.S. Senate's powerful Committee on the Judiciary, where he could block nearly every piece of civil rights legislation introduced in Congress. At the same time, the “Mississippi McCarthy” led the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), where he oversaw a relentless series of hearings on communists in the civil rights movement. Eastland literally “saw a red behind every black” (9). In 1964, when northern civil rights workers came to Mississippi to register black voters as part of the Freedom Summer campaign, Eastland called their efforts “communist inspired.” So calloused were his views, that even after three Freedom Summer volunteers in Mississippi—Mickey Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman—vanished, their murders at the hands of the local Ku Klux Klan a distinct probability, Eastland insisted that their disappearance was a publicity stunt concocted by the Communist Party.
The Real Annie Lee Moss

It was March 11, 1954. The witness was Annie Lee Moss, a civilian teletype operator for the U.S. Army in Washington, D.C. The hearing was convened by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. And the man asking her questions was none other than Senator Joseph McCarthy. When McCarthy departed the hearing room early, his critics took the opportunity to strike a blow against the absent senator. Under questioning from a more sympathetic senator, Stewart Symington (D-Mo.), Moss denied any connection with the Communist Party, denied knowing what “communism” meant, and noted that that there were “three Annie Lee Mosses,” living in Washington, casting doubt on the government’s evidence against her. She even claimed not to recognize the name “Karl Marx.” Footage of Moss’s testimony was featured on Edward R. Murrow’s television show See it Now, seen by over three million viewers (and much later, in George Clooney’s Good Night and Good Luck [2005]).

Moss came across as an object of pity—a helpless, ignorant “Negress” whose case illustrated the evils of McCarthyism. And, with an outpouring of public support, she kept her job.

But as historian Andrea Friedman has shown, Moss was consciously playing the fool. Born in 1905 in South Carolina, the daughter of tenant farmers, Moss worked as a domestic servant, laundress, and tobacco stammer, before moving to Washington and gaining a job in a government cafeteria. There, she became an active member of the United Public Workers, a left-leaning union. Most likely, Friedman concludes, Moss did join the party in these years—one-third of the party in D.C. was African American. Moss had also been active with her local church, the YMCA, the Urban League, and served as president of the tenants’ council of her housing project. A newspaper article described her as a “sparkplug” of community activism. Given the intense pressures bearing down on her in 1954, Moss denied her own history, catered to white paternalism, and survived. She never returned to political activism.

—Benjamin Aloe and Carl R. Weinberg

Race and Foreign Policy


Brenda Plummer’s Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960 (1996) marked the beginning of an explosion of literature devoted more directly to Cold War/civil rights issues in American foreign relations. Plummer highlights the role of African American organizations and leaders in forcing the United States to recognize race as a global concern. She describes myriad attempts by blacks during the Cold War to force policy makers to make good on their promises to support global self-determination and unite the “anti-imperialist movement abroad and the civil rights movement at home.” Penny Von Eschen’s Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (1997) also acknowledges the importance of anti-imperialism in the African American worldview, but argues that the Cold War tempered black criticism of European colonial practices. In hopes of bolstering White House support for domestic civil rights reform, and concerned over the anti-radical mood of the second Red Scare, major African American leaders muted their criticism of American foreign policy. And in The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (2001), Thomas Borstelmann reveals that American traditions of racial oppression have run counter to the nation’s attempts to lead a multiracial world since the beginning of the republic. However, he maintains, the United States largely triumphed over segregation and communism (11).

Mary Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (2000) is among the most readable of these books. Dudziak posits that reports of racial injustice coming out of the United States in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s threatened to upend the appeal of liberal capitalist democracy in the Cold War battlegrounds of Asia and Africa. Among the many stories she uses to illustrate her thesis is the tale of Malik Sow, the first ambassador to the United States from the then-newly-independent African nation of Chad. In 1961, on the road from delivering a speech to the United Nations in New York to Washington D.C., where he was scheduled to present his nation’s credentials to President John F. Kennedy, Sow stopped at a roadside diner in rural Maryland. The ambassador was immediately turned away by diner employees. They informed him that they did not serve blacks in the restaurant. The Kennedy administration, like the Truman and Eisenhower administrations before it, Dudziak concludes, came to support civil rights reform so as not to lose the emerging world to the communists (12).

Conclusion

Like the scholars studying domestic Cold War/civil rights, historians concerned with its manifestation in foreign policy have been undoubtedly affected by the passing of time and changing points of reference.
Indeed, the entire profession has changed with the end of the reorientation of national interests after 9/11, and with the appearance of a new generation of scholars less personally tied to the events of the 1950s and 1960s. The election of Barack Obama and China’s rise as a significant rival to the U.S. will surely refocus Cold War/civil rights studies in new ways. Yet this scholarship is also rooted in a timeless American attempt to balance the scales of liberty and security. These works remind us that international conflicts will forever challenge American definitions of its most basic freedoms, and that the ways in which the United States defines itself has a profound effect on the world. By integrating race and class conflict, political and social phenomena, and foreign and domestic events, Cold War/civil rights history illuminates the United States’ struggle for freedom and peace in the age of American power and global interdependence. It also just has a lot of fun mixing things up.

Endnotes


NOBODY TURN ME AROUND
A People’s History of the 1963 March on Washington
Charles Euchner

On August 28, 1963, over a quarter-million people—about two-thirds black and one-third white—held the greatest civil rights demonstration ever. As Charles Euchner reveals, the importance of the march is more profound and complex than standard treatments of the 1963 March on Washington allow. With rich oral histories from over one hundred participants—high-profile civil rights leaders but also ordinary Americans—Euchner offers a vivid tale of that day.


“A sweeping, comprehensive look at a pivotal march in American history.” —Booklist
History and Haggar Pants: White House Tapes and the Cold War

In 2007, while giving a talk in a small Ohio town about Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, I got a real scare. I was in the middle of playing a tape-recorded phone conversation from the Johnson White House when an elderly woman sitting about a half-dozen rows from the stage went into convulsions. A few people sitting around her swirled in their seats, faces contorted with alarm. I reached for the “pause” button, and contemplated my next move. Then she lifted her head from the desk, and the scare passed. She wasn’t having seizures, at least not in a medical sense; she was simply convulsed with laughter. Two words popped into my head immediately, words that will only make sense to someone who has worked with the Johnson tape recordings: “Haggar Pants.”

You see, the phone conversation we had been listening to at the time is one that has achieved near-legendary status. On August 9, 1964, Johnson placed a call to Joe Haggar of Haggar Clothing Company to order some custom-made pants. The graphic details of the conversation have stunned more than a few listeners and, during my lecture, at least, reduced a seventy-year-old woman to a quivering mass of hysterical jelly (1):

Johnson: Now another thing: the crotch, down where your nuts hang is always a little too tight. So when you make them up, give me an inch that I can let out there, because they cut me. They’re just like riding a wire fence. These are almost—these are the best that I’ve had anywhere in the United States.

Haggar: Fine.

Johnson: But when I gain a little weight, they cut me under there. So leave me . . . You never do have much margin there, but see if you can’t leave me about an inch from where the zipper [belches] ends around under my—back to my bunghole.

Haggar: All right sir.

Now, I admit that I always play “Haggar Pants” when I give talks about the tapes, and I often play it in my classroom. Sometimes I rationalize that there is historical merit to listening to Johnson describing his crotch, arguing that it humanizes the president and that, particularly in freshman-level survey courses, it makes it easier for students to accept the criticisms we will be leveling at past political leaders by dissuading them of any notion that these leaders are somehow more than human. But I am not fooling anyone, I suppose, and certainly not myself. Really, I play “Haggar Pants” to get a cheap laugh. But while “Haggar Pants” can offer a lesson in low-brow comedy, many of the other tapes can make a real contribution to the classroom. From fleshing out specific controversies in the historical record, to clarifying broader motives and unexpected imperatives, to putting a human face on American policymakers, the White House tapes offer an unparalleled resource for those who teach Cold War American history.

A Unique Source of History

Although there had been taping prior to the Kennedy administration, it was light and sporadic until the summer of 1962 when Kennedy had the Secret Service install hidden recording devices throughout the White House and the Executive Mansion, eventually producing almost 300 hours of taped conversations. The Kennedy Library deeded the tapes to the government in 1976, which began opening them to the public in 1981. Lyndon Johnson taped more extensively, and expanded the system to include the Johnson Ranch in Texas. Overall, he recorded almost 650 hours of tapes, which were given to the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library with the qualification that they were to remain sealed for fifty years.

However, the declassification process was sped along by the passage of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, which, in the wake of the controversial movie JFK (1991), required that all records maintained by the federal government that were relevant to the assassination be opened to public and congressional scrutiny. Accordingly, archivists at the Johnson Presidential Library in September 1993 released a collection of taped phone conversations related to Johnson’s ascension to the presidency.
Oval Office. With the precedent established, and with the support of Johnson’s family and closest advisors, the Library continued processing the rest of the collection. It was a fortuitous day for historians. “I felt for Johnson in a way that I couldn’t have before,” commented one presidential historian after listening to some of the tapes, “because when you live through a man’s life the way that you do when you’re listening to tapes and essentially listening to his life hour by hour, you see the almost impossible situation that he was in.” The tapes are now available from numerous places and in numerous formats: published in annotated collections; available on tape or CD from presidential libraries; or, in the format perhaps most useful for teachers, in streaming video from different websites, particularly the excellent one run by the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia <http://www.whitehousetapes.org/> (2).

Challenges of Listening to History
The tapes, of course, have their shortcomings as a teaching tool. Historians do not have to be reminded, although students may have to be, that they reveal just one part of a larger and more complicated decision-making puzzle. And yet, students often fixate on them at the exclusion of other forms of evidence, perhaps because listening to tapes is more fun than flipping through hundreds of pages of documents. They also need to be reminded constantly that the presidents can, to some extent, manipulate this medium. They choose which conversations to tape and which to ignore. They know they are being taped but the other participants do not. We cannot always detect sarcasm; we do not always know what has gone on before the conversation outside of earshot that may be impacting the decision-making process. And even when there is no conscious manipulation, the nature of the medium invites problems. Casual references and nicknames used between friends often leave the historian befuddled; anyone trying to decipher Johnson’s discussions about the 1965 Dominican Crisis, for example, would meet “J.B.”; “Colonel C.”; “Columbo”; “The Bang-Bangs”; and the “Baseball Players” (so nicknamed because their politics were “in left field”). There is also the simple fact that the clarity of the tapes is sometimes lacking. Some of the resulting problems have been amusing albeit unimportant, such as when Johnson’s secretary transcribed her boss’s lament that he had to meet “A pack of them bastards,” rather than correctly as “the Pakistani Ambassador,” or when an early version of a Nixon transcript incorrectly had him calling Judge John Sirica “A god-damned wop,” rather than praising him as the kind of “judge I want.”

In other cases, though, the difficulty in understanding specific words and phrases, particularly in the Kennedy tapes, can lead to more significant problems of historical interpretation. The Cuban Missile Crisis tapes have generated fierce disputes. Did Kennedy say, at an October 27, 1962 meeting, that the Soviets would not pull the missiles out of Cuba until they got some “compensation” or some “conversation”? Did Secretary of Defense McNamara suggest “we call off these air strikes tonight,” or “we call up these air squadrons tonight”? Obviously, when such high-stakes diplomacy is involved, even the smallest error in transcription can have enormous consequences for the historical record.

Debating Vietnam
And yet, despite these problems, the tapes remain a vital historical resource, one that can enhance both the classroom and the historical record. Consider, for example, Johnson and the 1964–1965 escalation of the Vietnam War. The early historical literature (and, I think, general contemporary memory) holds that an overconfident Johnson escalated American involvement, convinced that victory was inevitable, secure in the belief that although some short-term resistance was to be expected, the massive power of the United States would soon overwhelm a backward and somewhat primitive enemy. Such a belief, however, hardly squares with the Lyndon Johnson who spoke with McGeorge Bundy on March 2, 1964:

Bundy: What is your own internal thinking on this, Mr. President, that we’ve just got to stick on this middle course as long as there’s any possible hope and—

Johnson: I just can’t believe that we can’t take 15,000 advisors and 200,000 people and maintain the status quo for six months. I just believe we can do that, if we do it right. Now, I don’t know enough about it to know.

Bundy: God knows I don’t.

Johnson: I—

Bundy: The only thing that scares me is that the government would up and quit on us or that there would be a coup and we’d get invited out.

Johnson: There may be another coup.

Bundy: Yeah.

Johnson: But I don’t know what we can do if there is. I guess that we just . . . What alternatives do we have then? We’re not going to send our troops in there—are we?

It is easy, of course, to find snippets on the tapes to support almost any position, but a constant refrain through his conversations
is the sense that Johnson went into the war with his eyes open to its potential difficulties, but with an unwillingness to accept the political ramifications of withdrawal. At about the same time he was bemoaning the situation to Bundy, he solicited the views of newspaper titan John Knight. “I think long range over there, the odds are certainly against us,” Knight acknowledged. “Yes,” Johnson replied, “there is no question about that.”

Three months later Johnson spoke with Richard Russell:

Russell: It’s the damned worst mess I ever saw, and I don’t like to brag. I never have been right many times in my life, but I knew we were going to get into this sort of mess when we went in there. And I don’t see how we’re going to ever get out without fighting a major war with the Chinese and all of them down there in those rice paddies and jungles. I just don’t see it. I just don’t know what to do.

Johnson: Well, that's the way I've been feeling for six months.

Russell: It appears that our position is deteriorating, and it looks like the more we try to do for them, the less they are willing to do for themselves. It’s just a sad situation . . . It’s a hell of . . . a hell of a situation, it’s a mess. And it’s going to get worse . . .

Johnson: How important is it to us?

Russell: It isn't important a damn bit.

Johnson: [sighs]

Another frequent theme that runs throughout the Vietnam conversations is the important role that domestic politics played in the decision-making process. It is a topic, I believe, that resonates with contemporary students because of their experiences with the debates leading to the Iraq War. For example, Johnson, in the same conversation with Knight, lamented that he could “run and let the dominoes start falling over. And God Almighty, what they said about us leaving China would be just warming up compared to what they’d say now. I see Nixon’s raising hell about it today. And Goldwater, too.” Similarly, two years later, he unloaded on Gene McCarthy:

Well, I know we oughtn’t be there, but I can’t get out. I just can’t be the architect of surrender. . . . I’m willing to do damn near anything. If I told you what I was willing to do, I wouldn’t have any program. Dirksen wouldn’t give me a dollar to operate the war. I just can’t operate in a glass bowl with all these things.”

The Nixon White House offered even more stark assessments. After a December 1970 meeting in which Kissinger and Nixon discussed the timing of a planned “basic end-of-the-war announcement,” White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman recorded an entry in his taped diary. Kissinger, he noted:

argues against a commitment that early to withdraw all combat troops because he feels that if we pull them out by the end of ’71, trouble can start mounting in ’72 that we won’t be able to deal with, and which we’ll have to answer for at the elections. He prefers instead a commitment to have them all out by the end of ’72, so that we won’t have to deliver finally until after the elections and therefore can keep our flanks protected. This would certainly seem to make more sense, and the President seemed to agree in general, but he wants Henry to work up plans on it.

And for those who insist on hearing the link between domestic politics and Vietnam directly from Nixon’s mouth, they need only fast-forward two years to the now famous (infamous?) conversation the President had with Henry Kissinger on August 3, 1972:

Nixon: I look at the tide of history out there, South Vietnam probably is never going to survive anyway, I’m just being perfectly candid . . . There’s got to be, if we can get certain guarantees so that they aren’t . . . We also have to realize Henry, that winning an election is terribly important. It’s terribly important this year, but can we have a viable foreign policy if a year from now or two years from now, North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam? That’s the real question.

Kissinger: If a year or two years from now North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam, we can have a viable foreign policy if it looks as if it’s the result of South Vietnamese incompetence. If we now sell out in such a way, say that in a three-to-four month period, we have pushed President Thieu over the brink, we ourselves, I think there is going to be, even the Chinese won’t like
that. I mean, they’ll pay verbal, verbally they’ll like it—
Nixon: But it’ll worry them.
Kissinger: But it will worry everybody. And domestically, in
the long run, it won’t help us all that much because our oppo-
nents will say we should’ve done it three years ago.
Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: So we’ve got to find some formula that holds
the thing together a year or two, after which—after a year, Mr.
President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it, say, this
October, by January ’74, no one will give a damn.

The tapes shed light on many other debated aspects of the war.
None, of course, is definitive by itself, but together they have helped
flesh out the picture for historians, while at the same time offering
students a window into what the leadership was thinking. For exam-
ple, anyone teaching about the role the United States played in the
Diem assassination might want to incorporate Kennedy’s taped mono-
logue on November 4, 1963, in which the President admits that:
I feel that we must bear a good deal of responsibility for it, begin-
ing with our cable of early August in which we suggested the coup.

In my judgment that wire was badly drafted, it should never have been
sent on a Saturday. I should not have given my consent to it without
a roundtable conference at which McNamara and Taylor could have
presented their views.

Similarly, students interested in the government’s efforts to infil-
trate the antiwar movement should hear Nixon speaking with Haldem-
man in June 1971:

Nixon: We’ve got to have a couple of long hairs. Can I sug-
gest that’s one mistake we may be making? Do we have three
or four guys—hire long-haired, dirty looking bastards, you
know. . . . Have somebody, have some people that have our
confidence, I mean, get some long-haired bearded guys and
let them move among them. I think they could be terrifically
advantageous to us.

Haldeman: We have.

And students who have a hard time accepting the idea that the al-
leged second day of attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, on August 4, 1964,
reflected genuine confusion rather than the conspiracy of a pro-war military clique or of the Johnson political campaign, should listen to Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, talk by phone with Air Force General David Burchinal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Burchinal:** How many were engaged? Do you know?

**Sharp:** Let’s see. There must have been a total of six engaged, I think. Not sure on that yet.

**Burchinal:** Any aircraft?

**Sharp:** You mean enemy?

**Burchinal:** Yeah.

**Sharp:** No, I don’t. . . . Wait a minute, now. I’m not so sure about this number of engaged.

**Burchinal:** Right.

**Sharp:** We’ve had to check it out here.

**Burchinal:** OK.

**Sharp:** It may not be that high. No, no report on . . . We did have a report on bogeys [enemy aircraft] at one time, but we haven’t any confirmation of that . . .

**Burchinal:** Are they still exchanging fire?

**Sharp:** I’ve been so busy doing other things I haven’t looked at the last—whether they’re still shooting each other or not. . . . I can’t . . . I don’t see that they have. Here’s another one now I just got, let me see. [Reading report and summarizing] Well, the Maddox says she’s evaded about ten torpedoes, [chuckles] Two, two craft are sunk. No casualties to us and they got some ADs and A-4Ds on the scene. But they’re having trouble with illumination. The Turner Joy, or one of the two, was given star shell illumination for the planes. As far as we can tell there are only three [North Vietnamese] boats, but that doesn’t count up to that many torpedoes, I don’t think. Sounds to me like there are more boats than just three.

**Latin America**

It is, of course, not just in Vietnam where the tapes prove to be a tremendous historical tool. American policies in Latin America stand as a good example of where this new material is shaping new conclusions in scholarship, while also providing teachers with a new tool in the classroom. Early interpretations of the 1965 Dominican Crisis, for example, largely blamed the CIA and embassy officials for convincing Johnson that communist forces from outside the Dominican Republic had seized control of what started as an indigenous revolt. The tapes, however, reveal that Johnson was generally aware that the communists played only a minor role in that action, and yet he chose to escalate American involvement regardless, with domestic politics playing a critical role. I have just taken an action,” he told House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, “that will prove that Democratic presidents can deal with Communists as strongly as Republicans” (3).

Electoral politics seemed to be in the back of the President’s mind throughout the 1964 Panama Crisis as well; when Thomas Mann, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, argued in favor of an OAS-sponsored plan to “discuss without limits” the issues surrounding control of the Canal, an annoyed Johnson told him that “you may not be around to judge [American policies] if they [the voters] think we’re sitting down to revise some treaties.” The mere fact that Mann endorsed the OAS plan demonstrates the ways that the tapes can reshape conventional scholarship, since the common view of him as a conservative interventionist does not stand up to his conversations with Johnson about the crisis: “We need to give time for tempers to cool and sit down and look at these things [the treaties],” he told the President, endorsing a plan that he hoped would avoid an “explosive” situation (4).

Beyond their historiographical impact, these tapes can prove equally as useful in the classroom. When teaching about American interventions in Latin America in my “pre-tape” days, for example, I inevitably had one or two students express skepticism that the “Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave” would so callously meddle in the internal affairs of its neighbors and cooperate with human rights violators to advance its own interests. Those comments are much less frequent now that my class starts by listening to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy warning Johnson against getting too cozy with Brazilian president Castelo Branco in April 1964 (5):

**Bundy:** We’ve got a message that we want to send out to [Brazilian president] Castelo Branco on the occasion of his inauguration. . . . Our view in the White House . . . is that that you ought to be a little careful while this fellow is locking people up.

**Johnson:** I know it, but I don’t give a damn. I think that there’s some people that need to be locked up here and there, too . . . I haven’t got any crusade on ’em, but I don’t want . . . I wish they’d locked up some before they took Cuba.

**Cuban Missile Crisis**

Of course, no discussion of the tapes and Latin America would be complete without considering the Cuban Missile Crisis, which produced twenty-two hours of tense, fascinating recordings (6). On the teaching side, these tapes can transport a classroom into the middle of one of the most critical moments in modern American history. No longer do I need to tell students how dangerous things were in October 1962. Instead, I can show them firsthand, by having them listen to an October 19 recording of General Curtis LeMay desperately trying to talk President Kennedy out of the blockade in favor of an invasion:

This blockade and political action, I see leading into war. . . . This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich. . . . I just don’t see any other solution except direct military action right now. . . . A blockade, and political talk, would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this. And I’m sure a lot of our own citizens would feel that way, too.

Or they can listen to an ExComm meeting from October 24 when Kennedy, speaking of a hypothetical Soviet submarine operating near the blockade, asks casually, “If he doesn’t surface or if he takes some action, takes some action to assist the merchant ship, are we going to attack him anyway? At what point are we going to attack him?” Or they can eavesdrop on Kennedy’s phone call to former president Dwight Eisenhower for advice:

**Kennedy:** General, what about if the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, announces tomorrow, which I think he will, that if we attack Cuba that it’s going to be nuclear war? And what’s your judgment as to the chances they’ll fire these things off if we invade Cuba?

**Eisenhower:** Oh, I don’t believe they will.

**Kennedy:** You don’t think they will?

**Eisenhower:** No.

**Kennedy:** In other words you would take that risk if the situation seemed desirable?

**Eisenhower:** Well, as a matter of fact, what can you do?

**Kennedy:** Yeah.

**Eisenhower:** If this thing is such a serious thing, that we’re going to be uneasy and we know what thing is happening now. All right, you’ve got to use something.

**Kennedy:** Yeah.
The tapes have also left a mark on the scholarship of the Cuban Mission Crisis. They demonstrate the extent to which President Kennedy, despite his public hawkishness, was suspicious of the military and determined to avoid military solutions to what he considered to be a political problem. They also demonstrate that, to a greater extent than had been previously thought, most of his aides opposed trading the missiles in Cuba for a non-invasion pledge by the U.S. and a secret promise to remove American missiles in Turkey. Individual roles are now also being reexamined, with Robert Kennedy standing as a good example. Kennedy has been widely praised as a moderating voice throughout the crisis (a view helped in no small part by his own writings). His role as a peacemaker was epitomized in one of the most famous moments of the crisis, when he passed a note to the president that he now knew "how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor." However, the tapes reveal that he was likely advocating for an invasion of Cuba the first few days of the crisis, and thus his comment was meant literally; he was preparing for war, not advocating for peace. In fact, it appears to be George Ball who first broached the Pearl Harbor comparison, doing so as a means to argue against an invasion, warning that, "this coming in there, a Pearl Harbor, just frightens the hell out of me as to what goes beyond."

Conclusion
Overall, the sheer volume of the White House tapes makes it difficult to do them justice in an article as short as this. Their historical contributions to teaching and scholarship are simply extraordinary. They help us to explore the fundamental beliefs of policymakers about race (Nixon on African Americans: "I have the greatest affection for them, but I know they ain't gonna make it for 500 years. They aren't. You know it, too."); about gender (Johnson on the possible appointment of a woman to the Export-Import Bank: "And how old is she . . . Is she good-looking?"); and about ethnicity (Nixon on Mexican Americans: "At the present time, they have a heritage, but at the present time they steal, they're dishonest, they do a lot of other things . . . They don't live like a bunch of dogs, which the Negroes do live like."). They open windows into the Cold War, into Vietnam and Cuba, into the Great Society, into the civil rights reforms, into the War on Poverty. And yes, they even tell us about Lyndon Johnson's pants.

A Note on Audio Sources:
Teachers interested in integrating the presidential tapes into the classroom should start with the website run by the University of Virginia’s Miller Center for Public Affairs <http://www.whitehousetapes.org/>. This well-designed site offers links to hundreds of important conversations, and provides streaming video to accompany the audio segments. The Miller Center site also offers relevant background information, a special page of classroom activities and relevant syllabi, electronic copies of the president’s daily diaries, and much more. Useful links can also be found at various presidential libraries, especially the Johnson Library, <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/content.asp>; and the Nixon Library: <http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/tapeextracts/index.php>.

Other pages that offer more narrow selections can still be very useful. The largest collection of Nixon tapes is at: <http://nixon tapes.org/>, an excellent website that also offers extensive background material and analysis. Various media outlets offer highlights of the presidential conversations, with some of the best being American Radio Works (<http://americanradionworks.publicradio.org/features/prestapes/>), and C-Span Radio (<http://www.c-span.org/Series/American-Political-Archive.aspx>). Other good general collections can be found at the websites of the National Security Archive (<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>), the History and Politics Out Loud page (<http://www.hpol.org/index.html>), and finally, there are a handful of web pages that are devoted to specific topics that teachers might find useful: <http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/> focuses on Social Security, Medicare, and other related topics; the media resource page at UC-Berkeley has a good collection of Watergate tapes (<http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/watergate.html>) and the History Out Loud website has an excellent collection of Cuban Missile Crisis materials (<http://www.hpol.org/jfk/cuban/>).

Endnotes
1. All transcripts used in this article can be found at the webpage of the Presidential Recordings Program of the Miller Center for Public Affairs, at <http://millercenter.org/academic/presidentialrecordings>.


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For many Americans, one of the most enduring images of the Cold War is a little black-and-white cartoon turtle. “Burt,” as he was named by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, rose to iconic status after he starred in a 1951 film telling children that in case of nuclear fallout, the best line of defense was to “duck and cover” (1). Footage of children diving under desks to Burt’s happy song epitomizes our early twenty-first century impression of the naiveté of Americans who seemed to believe that such a flimsy maneuver might actually safeguard them from a nuclear attack, let alone the sickening effects of radiation. Our collective historical memory of Burt emphasizes the innocence and vulnerability of young children who are victims of anticommunist panic and the threat of nuclear war. If we let ourselves think broadly about the history of children during the Cold War, however, more topics emerge. They reach before and beyond the 1950s, encompassing children in other parts of the world, and disclosing not only what children represented to adults during various phases of the Cold War, but also, in some cases, their own thoughts and agency. This article will examine some central ideas and challenges encountered in pursuing the history of children, and will offer several examples that history instructors may find useful for helping students to learn about the Cold War.

Scholarly interest in the history of children, in various times and places, has surged in recent years (2). But what does it mean to pursue this history? Often it entails interpreting adults’ accounts of children, especially when historical evidence that comes directly from children is scarce (3). To try to understand how children experienced the past, historians use accounts from adults looking back on their childhoods. Even objects created for children—literature, school books, music, games, cartoons, radio and television programs, and movies—can tell us about what their creators thought children should see, hear, and learn about. These sorts of sources have the additional benefit of revealing what parents deemed appropriate for their children to consume, although it is necessary to seek out other sources to find out about children’s receptions of these products. Another question that arises when pursuing children’s history is how “children” are defined (4). This article takes “children” during the Cold War era to include infants through adolescents, recognizing that markers for achieving adulthood could be moveable within various communities in the United States and in other countries.

The New Significance of Children
In putting together a history of children during the Cold War, it is valuable to know what children meant to adults, and what adults expected of them. In the United States, having children took on new meaning early in the Cold War. Women’s fertility rates, which had been declining for over a century, began to rise around the same time that the United States entered World War II. This “baby boom” continued into the early 1960s, with the standard explanation that this reflected Americans’ desire to “return to peace and prosperity” after the hardships of the Great Depression and World War II. However, in Elaine Tyler May’s landmark 1988 book, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, May argues that this reasoning is incomplete (5). She contends that, among other things, Cold War fears—of governmental subversion by communism, of the loss of the American way of life, and of nuclear destruction—influenced the way Americans thought about marriage and families, which contributed to the phenomenal rise in births (6). The 1950s ideal household—a working husband-father, stay-at-home wife-mother, and three or four children, living comfortably in the suburbs—represented for Americans not only economic security and social stability, but also a refuge from and a stronghold against Cold War threats to the nation and society. According to May, “child rearing was one of the few ways of exerting influence on the world,” rather than a retreat from it (7). Although those who could realize the family ideal were predominantly white and affluent, the yearnings and pressures to live up to it were shared throughout American society. Indeed, birthrates boomed among whites and non-whites (8).

Overseas, children living on U.S. military bases also gained new significance to adults during the Cold War. American families lived at or near military bases in unprecedented numbers after World War II, initially to be with husbands and fathers stationed in the occupations of Germany and Japan, then during the Cold War. Adults thought that, with proper guidance, American children could learn to exhibit behavior that would strengthen relations between Americans and the
peoples of host nations. American adults hoped that, if their children behaved respectfully and demonstrated interest in local cultures, host peoples would see the United States as an ally in the Cold War rather than a militaristic intruder in their nation. Some older children internalized this belief, although even the youngest of children could facilitate friendships between Americans and local peoples (9). In one example, Jean Louise and Captain Lauren Elkin, living in a Japanese community in the 1950s, befriended their neighbors through their three-year-old son, Lauren Jr. Japanese children frequently came to his house and went for rides with him in his family’s car. Lauren learned Japanese words, which he then taught to his mother. Because of the friendship between the American and Japanese children, the parents of Lauren’s playmates invited the Elkin adults into their homes (10).

American adults also reached out to children of occupied and host countries, anticipating that their kindness and generosity would persuade them, in adulthood, to maintain their nation’s anti-communist alliance with the United States. In a 1959 letter to U.S. Lady, a magazine primarily for military wives, Army wife Routh Troubridge Wilby urged American women at U.S. bases abroad to “work with the young people of the [host] country. They are the future leaders and any good influence we may have on them will pay dividends for America in the years to come” (11). Navy wife Francis Lee Buck, disturbed by a communist city official’s visit to the destitute Okinawan high school at which she volunteered as a teacher, decided to counter his influence by inviting her forty students to her home. She fed them popcorn, Coca-Cola, lemonade, hot dogs, and chocolate chip cookies. “The girls admired the kitchen, especially the electric stove, the mixer, and the toaster,” wrote Buck in a 1961 U.S. Lady article. “The boys were fascinated by the electric lights, the flush toilet, and the television.” Buck hoped that her hospitality and consumer goods would persuade Okinawan youth that the standard of living on display in her home was preferable to what they would experience under a communist government, and to favor the Americans as allies in the Cold War (12).

Americans envisioned the actual and figurative adoption of children born in the United States and in other countries as yet another means to participate in the Cold War. Pearl Buck, author of The Good Earth, the 1932 novel documenting the lives and struggles of Chinese peasants, established an agency called “Welcome House” to arrange adoptions for U.S.-born children of Asian heritage in 1949. (Courtesy of Library of Congress)

American adults also reached out to children of occupied and host countries, anticipating that their kindness and generosity would persuade them, in adulthood, to maintain their nation’s anti-communist alliance with the United States. In a 1959 letter to U.S. Lady, a magazine primarily for military wives, Army wife Routh Troubridge Wilby urged American women at U.S. bases abroad to “work with the young people of the [host] country. They are the future leaders and any good influence we may have on them will pay dividends for America in the years to come” (11). Navy wife Francis Lee Buck, disturbed by a communist city official’s visit to the destitute Okinawan high school at which she volunteered as a teacher, decided to counter his influence by inviting her forty students to her home. She fed them popcorn, Coca-Cola, lemonade, hot dogs, and chocolate chip cookies. “The girls admired the kitchen, especially the electric stove, the mixer, and the toaster,” wrote Buck in a 1961 U.S. Lady article. “The boys were fascinated by the electric lights, the flush toilet, and the television.” Buck hoped that her hospitality and consumer goods would persuade Okinawan youth that the standard of living on display in her home was preferable to what they would experience under a communist government, and to favor the Americans as allies in the Cold War (12).

Figure 2. Winner of the Nobel Prize for her novel The Good Earth about Chinese peasants, author Pearl S. Buck was outraged at the treatment of Asian American orphans, who were often rejected by existing adoption agencies due to their racially mixed parentage. Here, Buck sits with Chinese American children adopted through Welcome House, Inc., which she founded in 1949. (Courtesy of Library of Congress)

Brown v. Board of Education case, nine African American teenagers attempted to attend the all-white Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. They received nationwide and international attention when white mobs converged on the school to obstruct their admission. When I teach about these events in my U.S. history survey course, I screen an excerpt from the documentary Eyes on the Prize (1987). I then ask my students to imagine how people around the nation and abroad might have reacted to the images (in newspapers, magazines, on television or in newsreels) of segregationists menacing the African American students. I also ask them to consider the turmoil in Little Rock in the international context of the Cold War, and in light of Americans’ claims that their country represented democracy and freedom in contrast to communist nations. (For more on the connections between the Cold War and civil rights, see Jeff Woods’ article in this issue.) Students learn about the U.S.-Soviet competition to win over recently independent Asian and African nations whose people paid close attention to the U.S. government’s responses to racial discrimination.
A brief scene from the same episode of Eyes on the Prize nicely illustrates the astute use of Cold War politics in the conflict, and how young people stood at the center of the drama. At a Thanksgiving dinner, Terrence Roberts, one of the “Little Rock Nine” students, states that “I know that communists enjoy taking advantage of situations such as these to twist the minds of peoples of the world. But I’m thankful that in America their actions are being foiled through the efforts of many democratic-minded citizens” (18). Afterwards, students in my class discuss how his framing of the politics of anticommunism differed from accusations that civil rights activists were aiding communists by subverting American ways. I also ask students to analyze political cartoons that depicted the integration of the Little Rock high school as an event of international concern (19).

The advent of the atomic bomb also brought the Cold War into the classroom. Studies conducted by psychologists and sociologists offer insight into children’s concerns about the Cold War and the threat of nuclear attacks, confirming that fears of communism and nuclear war indeed loomed large in the minds of many children, even the very young (20). Dr. Sibylle Escalona of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine found that even four-year-old children are “aware of a danger to life. . . . Fallout, Russia, radiation, H-bomb are all part of their vocabulary,” leading children to understand the possibility of “mutually assured destruction” (21). In schools, children seriously practiced defending themselves against nuclear attack and in 1961, a boy wrote to President Kennedy that “I am 9 years old. I don’t like the plans that you are planning. I am too young to die” (22).

Interviews, oral histories, and other retrospective accounts are another way to learn about how those who were children at a particular time experienced historical events. Looking back on the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, American adults who had been children at that time recalled feeling that war was imminent. Newspapers also reported on children’s reactions to the crisis. It is possible that growing up with a ubiquitous fear of nuclear war contributed to baby-boomers’ distrust of authority figures and fueled their social, cultural, and political activism in the 1960s (23).

The Vietnam War, a Cold War conflict that brought injury and death to millions of people and environmental devastation to Southeast Asia, shaped the lives of children and youth on all sides of the war. Boys in the United States and Vietnam wondered if they would be drafted into their countries’ militaries when they came of age. In the United States, many young men joined the military voluntarily, some because they deeply believed in the need to combat communism. Others who did not support the war thought it inevitable that they would be drafted, so they joined the military to exercise some control over their futures. Still other youth joined political causes, many protesting the war, some supporting it. Young people listened to music of the era that objected to the killing, such as the 1965 song “Eve of Destruction” in which Barry McGuire sang “You’re old enough to kill, but not for votin’/You don’t believe in war, but what’s that gun you’re toting?” Children fretted about fathers, older siblings, and other relatives who went to Vietnam, and grieved their deaths. Families also tried to cope with military personnel who survived the war, but came home physically or psychologically injured. In 1971, during the Vietnam War, Congress amended the Constitution to reduce the voting age from twenty-one years old to eighteen, exemplifying the legal and social adjustability of boundaries separating childhood and adulthood.

Awareness of the effects of the Vietnam War on children and youth beyond the United States reminds us of our nation’s historical interconnectedness with the world, a concept increasingly emphasized in scholarship and teaching. Millions of the children of communists, anticommmunists, and “the people in the middle” in Vietnam experienced the loss of loved ones, bombings, the destruction of homes and villages, sexual assaults, maiming, and death. Photographs of Vietnamese children harmed and killed in the war remain among the most enduring images of the era: think of the pictures of babies and small children among the piles of bodies in the March 1968 My Lai massacre, first published in Life magazine in November 1969; and of terrified nine-year-old Phan Thị Kim Phúc in 1972, running naked down a road, her clothes burned off by napalm, her flesh hanging in strips. Hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian children left their countries because of the war, some as refugees with their families, others as orphans. In 1975, over 2,000 children living in South Vietnam were taken to the United States and other countries via “Operation Babylift” (24). Agents for this program told parents that the children would suffer at the hands of communists who were about to take over South Vietnam and would be better off living abroad. The documentary Daughter from Danang (2003) uses footage showing the distress of the separation of children from their mothers (25). Children in Laos and Cambodia also suffered from the expansion of the Vietnam War into their countries, and from the civil wars and the tyrannical governments established in its wake. To this day, unexploded ordnance remains a danger to children playing and farming at contaminated sites (26).

In the mid-1970s, American concern about the Cold War ebbed with the Nixon administration’s efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China, and the end of the Vietnam War. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 revitalized anticommunism and renewed the arms race between the superpowers. Popular protest against nuclear weapons burgeoned in the United States, Western Europe, and the
documentary excavation of the Cold War era is not as daunting as for earlier historical periods, even for discovering sources created by children themselves. It is still in the recent past and there are many accessible records. Of course, all of us who study children of the past must be mindful of children’s diversity, since race, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic class, age, region, and numerous other factors shaped their experiences and worldviews (31). Students today may find it enjoyable and educational to record and analyze accounts of those who experienced the Cold War as children and to learn about their memories of the end of the Cold War. Perhaps students will find history even more engaging if they learn the histories of the generations of young people who came before them.

Figure 4. This 1972 Pulitzer-winning photograph of nine-year-old Phan Thi Kim Phúc running from a South Vietnamese army napalm attack has become an icon of the Vietnam War. Images of suffering children were especially effective in raising awareness of the war’s impact, prompting the adoption of thousands of South Vietnamese children, and fueling the efforts of protest groups such as the Vietnam Peace Parade Committee to mobilize opposition to the war. (Courtesy of Library of Congress)

Pacific, as did music, movies, and other expressions of fear of nuclear holocaust. In the fall of 1983, American parents and teachers debated whether or not children should watch the ABC television movie The Day After, which vividly depicted the effects of a nuclear missile attack on a community in Lawrence, Kansas: the immediate incineration of people and buildings at ground zero, the radiation sickness and gradual deaths of those who survived the initial blasts, and the collapse of society. The National Education Association warned parents against allowing young children to watch the movie (27). A New York Times article reported that teenagers who had seen it felt depressed and hopeless; some were even convinced that the aftermath of a real nuclear attack would be much worse than what the film depicted (28).

Polls and studies conducted in the 1980s showed that adolescents in countries other than the United States also worried about the consequences of nuclear war. In 1981, most thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds surveyed in the Dutch city of Groningen thought that “nuclear war would occur and destroy their city,” which nearly half did not expect to survive. A study of Soviet children between the ages of nine and seventeen years old found that for eighty-eight percent of them, nuclear war was their foremost fear; after that, they most strongly feared the death of their parents. Interestingly, American children chiefly feared the death of their parents, with nuclear war running second (29).

**Conclusion**

Historians of children lament the dearth of sources that come directly from children rather than through “adult filters” (30). Fortunately,

**Endnotes**

3. Ibid.
5. Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era, revised 20th anniversary edition (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 4–5, Table 2, “Fertility Rate per 1,000 Women Aged 15–44.”
6. Ibid., 13.
7. Ibid., 151.
10. Ibid., 203.
11. Ibid., 104–5; quotation from Mail Call, “Dependants, We Have a Challenge,” U.S. Lady, December 1959, 5.
14. Ibid., 175.
15. Ibid., 178; Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors, 146.
22. George, Awaiting Armageddon, 139.

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When Nike Meant Missiles: Exploring Local Vestiges of the Cold War

To the people of ancient Greece, the term “Nike” represented the winged goddess of victory. For any child growing up in the 1990s, Nike brought to mind sneakers, athletics, Michael Jordan, and cries of “Just Do It,” the Nike, Inc. slogan. Today, millions of people worldwide walk to the gym in Nike trainers, run in Nike shorts, and watch Nike-sponsored events on television while cheering on their favorite Nike-sponsored athletes. Whether on modern-day basketball courts or Greek battlefields, “Nike” has always echoed triumph and glory. During the Cold War, however, Nike had a more specific meaning: protection against the Soviet communist threat.

While we tend to think of the military dimensions of the Cold War as occurring in Europe or Asia, the Nike anti-aircraft missile program, begun by Bell Laboratories in 1945, brought the Cold War home to ordinary Americans in communities across the United States. Nike missiles were a response to the growing danger of Soviet weaponry, which posed a formidable threat of attack to U.S. cities and forces on the ground. Throughout the 1950s, the United States Army installed these missiles to protect major population centers and strategic locations from attack. Initially a conventionally armed missile that could reach heights of 68,000 feet, later models carried a nuclear warhead, traveled much higher, and could reach speeds over 3,000 miles per hour. Nike batteries were constructed across the nation in circular patterns in order to protect major areas of defense. For nearly two decades, the presence of Nike missiles served as a tangible reminder that the Cold War between the two superpowers could turn hot at any moment. By the late 1960s and into the 1970s, however, the Nike missiles and their launching sites became obsolete due to the rapidly advancing technology of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), arms reduction treaties, and budget cuts.

Although they now serve as remnants of a past era, photographs and information about the Nike missile sites are powerful ways to teach students about this episode in U.S. history. One challenge in teaching the Cold War lies in helping students to appreciate and understand the very real fears and tensions felt by average Americans throughout the conflict. Most Americans viewed the Soviet Union as an immediate threat that could bring war and destruction to their hometowns at any moment. The numerous Nike missile sites across the United States, allow many teachers across the nation to use the abandoned Nike missile system as an artifact in students’ own hometowns, highlighting the ever-present reminder of fear in life during the Cold War. While the source of a Cold War sense of danger may have been postwar Soviet advancements in technology—such as jet-propelled planes and nuclear-armed, long-range bombers—Americans also witnessed the presence of their own military capabilities, which served as an instant and constant reminder of the threat of war. Because we currently live in a new era filled with its own uncertainties of attack, teaching students about the ways Americans responded to past threats allows them to examine change and continuity over time.

This lesson idea works well as an introduction to the Cold War, as students begin to explore the meaning of this historical era and its impact on the American people. The lesson could also be employed...
to introduce the arms race during the Cold War, particularly focusing on Americans’ response to the threat of nuclear war. Finally, by making comparisons to current responses to security threats in the U.S., the lesson might also be used in a contemporary issues course where students study topics like nuclear proliferation.

**Time Frame**

The following lesson using a photograph of a Nike missile site in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (see Figure 3) takes one fifty-minute class period.

**Student Objectives**
1. To analyze and interpret a photograph for content and context.
2. To draw comparisons between major national events and the effects on local communities across the country.
3. To compare and contrast the ways Americans have dealt with the fear of attack over time, and its impact on social life in the U.S.
4. To collaborate with classmates in arriving at a deeper understanding of the Cold War.

**Procedure**

In this lesson, a photograph showing a Nike missile site in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, during the Cold War is projected for all students to view at the front of the room. Before viewing the photograph, students are given one of four different colored sheets of paper with one of the following headings at the top: Location, Purpose, Reaction of a nearby bystander, and Aftermath. As students view the picture displayed on a screen, they are given ten minutes to answer, on their own, a list of specific questions related to their heading.

Students who focus on the location represented in the photograph are asked to answer the following questions:
1. What type of community and landscape do you see in this photograph (e.g., urban, rural, suburban, tropical) and what clues from the photograph help you identify the type of place depicted here?
2. What buildings or landmarks help to identify where this photograph may have been taken?
3. Do you recognize any of the buildings or landmarks in the photograph? If so, what do you think they are?
4. What other details in the photograph might help you identify a region of the country, or even the specific place where the picture was taken?

Students who investigate the purpose of the photograph are asked to answer the following questions:
1. What do you think the main object in this photograph was used for?
2. What details from the photograph support your conclusion?
3. What people or groups might have supported this object being placed here? What people or groups might have opposed the object being placed here?

The students who are asked to offer a reaction of a nearby bystander respond to the following questions:
1. How might you feel if you lived close to the object in the photograph? Describe specific emotions, ideas, and attitudes.
2. Do you think that you would have supported or opposed placing the main object here? Why or why not?
3. Do you think your response to living close to this object would be similar or different from other people living close to you? Why or why not?

Finally, students who are asked to speculate on this scene’s aftermath are asked to answer the following questions:
1. Are there clues in the photograph that help explain what may have happened to this scene today? If so, explain what might be different.
2. Why do you think this scene stayed the same or changed?
3. Based on the location of this scene, what might this place look like today? What leads you to believe this?

When students have answered the questions on their own, they are placed into groups of four where each group member represents one of the four different aspects of the photograph (location, purpose, reaction, and aftermath). In these small groups, students are asked to share their responses to their questions with each other and add further comments to their classmates’ analysis of each aspect of the photograph. Students are also encouraged to ask further questions of their peers and how they arrived at their particular responses to the questions.

After students have had about ten to fifteen minutes to analyze the photographs and share their ideas in small groups, the next ten to fifteen minutes are spent discussing their responses and the conversations that they had in their small groups with the entire class. During this sharing session, it is important for the teacher to ask students how they arrived at their responses, and to particularly focus on any details from the photograph that the students use to draw their conclusions. In doing so, students are not only being taught about past events, but also the ways that historians use contextual clues and small details to draw conclusions about a primary source.

Once students have finished sharing their small group responses, the final ten to fifteen minutes are spent on a large group discussion where students are asked to respond to the following questions:
1. How does this photograph add to your understanding of the Cold War fought primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union in the second half of the twentieth century?
2. How does the way that Americans attempted to defend themselves from attack during the Cold War compare with the ways that they attempt to defend themselves today in an era of possible threats from terrorist attacks?

**Resources**

Having background about the Nike missile program and the nation’s efforts to protect itself against attack is very useful in offering students an overview of this initiative in U.S. history. The book *Rings of Supersonic Steel* (2002) by Mark L. Morgan and Mark A. Berhow offers a detailed account of the Army’s Nike surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. In addition to an overview of the Nike missile program and its termination, the book includes detailed maps of Nike missile sites in communities across the nation, along with a number of photographs of the weapons in places like Chicago, Los Angeles, and Baltimore. Diagrams of different types of Nike missiles and the inner workings of both the missiles and the operation sites add even more insight into this topic in Cold War history.

While *Rings of Supersonic Steel* includes some specifics about the Nike program in many places, other resources also exist to add details to the history behind the missile sites in specific localities. In the case of Milwaukee, a book by local historian John Gurda entitled *The Making of Milwaukee* (1999) includes the photograph used in this lesson and a brief discussion of the history behind the city’s Nike missile site (2). A subsequent article written by Gurda in the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* provides even more information about Milwaukee’s...
downtown missile location and his own recollection of this era in the community’s past (3).

Websites and news articles also offer photographs and important details about Nike missile sites in other localities across the nation. For example, the National Park Service’s website includes a description and historical background about the missile site in the San Francisco Bay Area’s Golden Gate National Recreation Area (<http://www.nps.gov/goga/nike-missile-site.htm>), along with a map of all the Nike missile sites in the Bay Area and historic photographs of the weapons (4). An article written by Vicki Ortiz Healy in the May 15, 2009 edition of the Chicago Tribune explains a bit of the history behind some of the Nike sites in and around Chicago, including recollections from soldiers who served at the bases (5). Another article in USA Today by Sarah Larimer describes a Nike missile site that can be toured in the Everglades National Park and also includes a description of other Nike sites in Florida (6).

When combined with other resources on the Cold War, such as Paul Boyer’s By the Bomb’s Early Light (1985), students can gain an even broader understanding of living during this tense era in American history. Boyer’s book includes a number of political cartoons, pictures, literary excerpts, and even public opinion polls. By examining the social and cultural impact of living during the Cold War, students gain deeper insight into the personal effects of being surrounded by weapons of mass destruction.

Reflections

In my own use of this lesson, I presented a photograph of a Nike missile site once located in my students’ home community of Milwaukee. However, I did not reveal to them the location of the photograph until the end of the exercise. This added to their curiosity and interest throughout the lesson and caused great surprise when they learned that this photograph was a local scene. Some photographs of Nike missile sites do not necessarily include the detail displayed in the Milwaukee picture used in this lesson; however, even the smallest contextual clues from other photographs can be examined by students to arrive at conclusions about the locations of these objects. For example, in the case of the missile near downtown Milwaukee, a few students attempted to identify the buildings in the background to determine the location of this picture. If they could not do so, they were often at least able to state with confidence that this was taken in an urban area.

Another aspect of the photograph that many students noticed is what appears to be snow on the ground by the missile and the appearance of a large body of water. In a few cases, this helped students make an educated guess that this was Milwaukee or some other major city in the United States with these geographic features.

Although students frequently identified the object as some type of missile, they often struggled to ascertain that its specific purpose was to shoot down enemy aircraft. Many students mistakenly identified this weapon as an ICBM designed to strike enemy nations. Furthermore, students sometimes struggled to explain why such a weapon would be located so close to a major population center and in such plain view of the public. In particular, my students had a hard time understanding why such a weapon would be placed in Milwaukee. Therefore, the photo opened up discussion about the significant industrial contributions made by their city to our nation’s defense, the larger size of the community’s population during this period of time, and why this made a Nike missile site necessary.

Students’ responses to the question that asked them to offer a reaction of a possible bystander varied widely. Some students said they would feel quite protected by having such a weapon defending their community so close to them; other students said that this weapon would produce fear that their community might come under attack. Regardless of students’ personal responses, their replies often collectively suggested that the missile would serve as a constant reminder that the nation was at war.

This could also be a great place to insert some of the ideas and sources presented in Paul Boyer’s By the Bombs Early Light. For instance, Boyer includes data from public opinion polls showing that “[i]n 1959, sixty-four percent of Americans listed nuclear war as the nation’s most urgent problem.” However, this percentage dropped to sixteen percent by 1964 (7). When this data is combined with students’ own personal reactions to the photograph, it can offer them a broader context for understanding their sentiments and those of their classmates. Furthermore, additional information, like the public opinion polls in Boyer’s book, gives students a practical opportunity to see how historians use multiple data sources, from photographs to statistics, to gain multiple perspectives and a deeper understanding of a topic in our nation’s past.

The discussion on the aftermath of the scene depicted in the photograph produced a very strong reaction from students in the case of the Milwaukee Nike missile site photograph. Students were shocked to learn that this site is now known as the Summerfest grounds, which hosts one of the largest music festivals in the United States and a variety of ethnic festivals during the summer months. Almost all of my students have attended one of these recreational events and had a hard time imagining that land once used for public defense is now used for...
public entertainment. This final aspect of the photograph also helped to generate interesting ideas for the last few questions discussed as a whole group.

During the large group discussion, when students were asked to relate their reactions to their understanding of the Cold War, the responses often revealed that they had deeper insights into the Cold War than they had expected. A number of them commented that they understood the fear and tension that gripped many people during that period of time, and others remarked that the photograph helped make them aware of the way our nation was fighting the Soviet Union without ever directly firing upon them, a key element to understanding the concept of Cold War.

When the discussion turned to current ways we protect ourselves locally against attack, observations generally included the heightened security at airports and public events that students have noticed over the past few years since the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, recent debates over the construction of a missile defense shield in Europe and international efforts to prevent nations like North Korea and Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons could just as easily be infused into the conversation, to broaden students’ awareness of national efforts to protect United States citizens and allies from attack. Students should be led to understand that the weapons of war and the methods of attack have changed over time, but that the controversy over the use of resources and of finding the most effective protective methods endures.

Extended Lesson Activities and Ideas

While the analysis of a picture of a Nike missile site takes approximately one class period, a wide range of extended activities can add greater depth and knowledge to understanding the Nike missile program and the various methods of defense used in the past and currently. The following lesson ideas are designed to build further historical knowledge and analytical skills.

To begin with, taking a class tour of a Nike missile site, or asking students to visit the former sites, can provide them with a more direct connection to this topic and the Cold War era in U.S. history. Traveling to a local site also gives students a deeper understanding of history in their own community and the ways that local places have evolved over time. This may even spark students’ interest in the transformation of other places in the community as time has progressed.

Another way to extend students’ learning outside of the community could involve having them interview older community members who might remember the existence of the Nike missile sites in their locality. Students could write a report on their findings using direct quotations from interviews and then share their findings with the rest of the class. An alternative to this assignment could be to invite someone from the community who has clear recollections of a Nike missile site and life during the Cold War to be a guest speaker so that he or she can describe his or her experiences to students. Students could draft questions in advance, which may then be relayed to the speaker to enhance this class activity.

Furthermore, a class debate could be conducted on whether or not the benefits of defense from operations like the Nike missile system outweighed the financial costs and resulting fear of attack. Research for this project could help students broaden their knowledge about the social, cultural, and economic effects of military defense. Helpful books include David Miller’s The Cold War: A Military History (1999), which contains a description of the financial costs associated with weapons during this period of time, and Stephen Schwartz’s Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (1998), which has even more details about the fiscal burdens associated with trying to protect a nation against attack. Students may be able to research more recent data about defense spending since September 11, 2001, to draw comparisons as well. This discussion could easily pave the way for a dialogue about whether or not our government is currently doing enough to protect us from an attack and the subsequent consequences of focusing more resources on defense.

Finally, students could create a “primary” source from the era that would embody their own reaction to living in a community with these weapons in their midst. For example, students might draft a letter to the editor of a newspaper from the late 1950s that voices their support or opposition to such weapons in the community. A student might draw a political cartoon from the perspective of a Soviet news agency reacting to the existence of United States weapons made to defend against a possible U.S.S.R. attack. A speech from an army official
explaining the purpose of weapons like the Nike missile could offer another point of view on this topic. Clearly, there are a wide variety of activities to both extend and assess students’ understanding of the Cold War era in American history.

Further Reading


Healy, Vikki Ortiz “Old missile sites are silent reminders of a tense time,” Chicago Tribune, May 15, 2009.


Endnotes


John DeRose teaches U.S. history at Whitefish Bay High School in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. He is currently completing a doctorate in social studies education at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Author of articles in Social Education, Rethinking Schools, and The History Teacher, DeRose was named Wisconsin’s History Teacher of the Year in 2008 by the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History.
The Venona Project and Cold War Espionage

On June 19, 1953, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were put to death in the electric chair. Their crime? Conspiracy. Convicted of providing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union, the Rosenbergs were the only people put to death in the United States for espionage during the Cold War. The Rosenberg case illuminates a highly charged debate on recently declassified U.S. government records that bear on the subject of Cold War espionage—the Venona documents. Using these primary sources to introduce students to the general topic of Cold War espionage, and the specific case of the Rosenbergs, provides a fruitful opportunity to address the interpretive nature of history and the evaluation of evidence, in addition to injecting a compelling drama into our narrative of the Cold War.

Background
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Cold War relationship between the Americans and the Soviets was the development of vast networks of spies and counter spies. Each side used this arena to gather information on its opponent, as well as to spread misinformation. Indeed, the United States went through an era of spy hysteria during the McCarthy era, which turned the Cold War inward. Because of the highly secretive nature of espionage, information about it can be difficult to obtain; however, once the Cold War ended and time passed, new secret documents have come to light.

Of this newly accessible information, one of the most illustrative is a series of documents created by the Venona Project. Released to the public in 1995 by the National Security Agency (NSA), Venona was a top-secret effort to intercept and decrypt messages sent by the Soviet government to spies working in the United States in the 1940s. Under Venona, American and British cryptologists spent two years breaking the Soviet code, and then used this information to document the activity of Soviet spies within the United States. This project was instrumental in the exposure and arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

The story of the Rosenbergs, however, starts with a German-born atomic scientist named Klaus Fuchs. In 1949, Fuchs confessed to stealing atomic secrets and providing them to the Soviet Union. His act of espionage helped the Soviet Union explode its first atomic weapon that same year. At his trial Fuchs could not provide the names of his American contacts, but investigation under the Venona Project revealed that Fuchs had been in contact with David and Ruth Greenglass, both of whom were acting under the direction of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The Rosenbergs—Communist Party members and members of the International Workers Order—were taken into custody in 1950 and charged with espionage. Although they pleaded not guilty to the charges, three years later Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed. For an excellent online source of information about the case, visit: <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/rosenb/rosenb.htm>.

The Rosenberg case caused great controversy in the 1950s, and it continues to do so today. Was the information gathered enough to convict them of espionage? If they were indeed guilty, was the punishment proportional to the crime? These are questions that can generate excellent discussion among students on both the nature of the trial and the domestic Cold War tensions it reveals. But perhaps more importantly, being able to compare the Venona documents to historical accounts of Cold War espionage gives students a hands-on chance to understand the interpretative nature of historical research.

Time Frame
Two to three forty-minute class periods.

Student Objectives
To understand the role of espionage in the Cold War.
To interpret primary source documents.
To understand the study of history as an evolving practice.
To compare different interpretations of history.
National Standards

Era 9: Postwar United States (1945–early 1970s)
Standard 3A: Explain the relationship between postwar Soviet espionage and the emergence of internal security and loyalty programs under Truman and Eisenhower.

Historical Thinking
Standard 2A: Identify the author or source of the historical document or narrative and assess its credibility.
Standard 3F: Compare competing historical narratives.
Standard 3I: Evaluate major debates among historians.

Teacher Preparation

While historians accept the authenticity of the Venona documents, there has been great controversy over their historical significance. To learn about Venona, the following works should be consulted: Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (1999) by Haynes and Klehr; The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors (2000) by Romerstein and Breindel; and Schrecker’s Cold War Triumphalism (2004) and Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (1998). Also helpful are Cold War encyclopedias such as Trahair’s Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations (2004), and collections of primary sources such as Cold War Primary Sources (2004) by Hanes and Hanes.

To convey the scholarly debate over Venona, it can be useful to contrast Chapter One of Romerstein and Breindel’s The Venona Secrets and Chapter Five of Schrecker’s Cold War Triumphalism. A comparison of these works shows two very different interpretations of espionage, and the Cold War in general. Romerstein and Breindel, former cold warriors who served as professional staff members of the House and Senate Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence, take a traditionalist point of view. They hold the Soviet Union primarily responsible for the emergence of internal security and loyalty programs during World War II, including the convenience in finding a common enemy in Nazi Germany and the tensions which eventually caused these one-time allies to become enemies. Because students may have a romanticized or cynical view of espionage, a short discussion of the Venona documents prove its intent to undermine American democracy. In their work, the pair assert that “...to a very great degree, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was, in fact, irrelevant to the anti-Communist cause” (1), and that the effort to rid the government of Communist infiltration and influence was actually the work of Harry Truman and a bipartisan majority of Congress (2). In contrast, Schrecker takes a revisionist view. She cautions that scholars should take care not to find more danger in the Venona documents than they truly reveal. “There are too many gaps in the record to use these materials with complete confidence,” she warns, and provides a critical look at the effects of McCarthyism (3). In a comment on this controversy, Schrecker once asked, “As historians, can’t we just call a truce and examine whatever pieces of the historical record challenge us intellectually without having to take sides” (4)? But it does not seem as though a truce will happen anytime soon.

Student Preparation

This lesson plan can be used in multiple places during your study of the Cold War. In order to provide historical context, however, students should have already discussed the nature of the U.S./Soviet alliance during World War II, including the convenience in finding a common enemy in Nazi Germany and the tensions which eventually caused these one-time allies to become enemies. Because students may have a romanticized or cynical view of espionage, a short discussion of the ULTRA Program of World War II can serve as an illustration of espionage’s history and importance. The code name given to the Allies’ program to read encrypted German messages, ULTRA played a large part in the Allied victory at Normandy. By using ULTRA to send misinformation to the Germans, the Allies were able to convince the Germans that their invasion was to take place at Calais, not Normandy. The overall success of this act of spying by the Allied forces helps show students that spying is a way to provide an advantage for one group over another, and plays a significant role in foreign affairs.

Additionally, students must know the difference between the words “covert” and “overt.” Covert operations are carried out by a select few people with highly specialized training, and seek to hide the identities of operatives and their sponsors. In contrast, overt operations are not hidden. These operations can range from reading a foreign newspaper and glean- ing it for information to large scale military operations authorized by Congress. There is nothing highly secretive or illegal about this and everyone knows that it goes on.

Procedures

Day One

Either at the start of class or through homework assigned the night before, familiarize the students with Cold War espionage, especially the cases of Klaus Fuchs and the Rosenbergs.

Ask your students to brainstorm about common perceptions of spies. They will likely think of James Bond or Jason Bourne books and
Figure 3. In 1995, the U.S. Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy released the previously classified documents produced by the Venona Project, a decades-long collaboration between the U.S. and U.K. to decrypt messages sent by Soviet intelligence agents during World War II. In this 1944 message to Moscow, a Soviet agent in New York describes a successful effort by Julius Rosenberg (ANTENNA) to recruit U.S. Bureau of Standards employee, and fellow Communist, Max Elitcher to take photographs of classified government information on naval guns. (Courtesy of National Security Agency)
movies, and they most certainly will have a romantic vision of what it is to be a spy. However, the practice of espionage during the Cold War focused much more on the systematic gathering of information and strategic intelligence, rather than the high-speed chases and explosions that often represent espionage on film.

Ask students to consider the following questions:
1. Why do nations spy on each other?
2. Is spying ethical? Can it be justified? It may be helpful to relate the situation to coaches who “spy” on competitors before a big game. Why do they watch the game of a big rival? Why would they watch films of a team they will play? The answer, of course, is to know the opposition and gain an advantage. Is this unfair? Is this unethical?
3. Ask the students to consider the impact of Cold War spies by asking:
   a. How did these people and events influence the Cold War?
   b. Did they help keep the balance of power and thus keep peace?
   c. Was the United States’ treatment of convicted spies justified?

Day Two
The teacher should briefly communicate what the Venona Project was, its significance, and the current debate surrounding it. This is a great opportunity to discuss the interpretive nature of history, by asking students:
1. How can historians look at the same evidence and come to different conclusions?
2. Which historian seems to make the best argument about the Venona documents, and why? (Consider political motivations, personal biases, and use of evidence.)
3. What is at stake in the debate about Venona? What are the specific implications of historical arguments about the Cold War and communism?

Once students have background information, they should put on the historian’s hat and look at the actual evidence themselves. Typically students show great interest in this part of the lesson, perhaps because they feel as though they are being let in on a secret.

Declassified Venona documents are available at <http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/Venona/index.shtml>. The students’ research should be focused on documents from 1944, and they should search for information about Fuchs and the Rosenbergs. Because of the volume of documents available on the NSA site, teachers may want to direct students to specific documents to get them started: good examples include February 9, 1944 release 1 and May 8, 1944 release 1, which both seem to suggest that Fuchs was spying on the American atomic program; and May 22, 1944 release 1, July 26, 1944 release 1, and September 21, 1944 release 1, which deal with spycraft and spy recruitment by the Rosenbergs. It is important that the students read the footnotes which explain the code words used in the documents.

Another resource is the collection of documents at the FBI website, <http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/venona.htm>. This is a seventy-five page PDF file, excerpts of which can be printed for students. What may also be of interest to students is the CIA’s press release regarding the Venona documents, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1995/pr71195.html>. If students have a difficult time wading through all of the primary source material, they may visit the PBS NOVA website on the Venona documents at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/venona/>, which narrows the search down to four documents.

Students should come up with their own interpretations, and evaluate the primary sources themselves. As the students read these primary sources, they should do four things:
1. Establish what the document means.
2. Assess what Fuchs and the Rosenbergs were doing.
3. Establish whether or not the spies in question were doing anything illegal.
4. After examining all of the evidence, students need to consider and discuss the following:
   a. Did the Rosenbergs pass information to the Soviets?
   b. What do we make of it if they did? Was it right to put them to death?

Day Three
Confronted with the documentary evidence as well as conflicting scholarly arguments, students may well be confused. They should be assured that historians not only examine evidence, but also test that evidence against conclusions published in the scholarship. On day three, students can take a step back and make a side-by-side comparison of their textbooks and the evidence presented by the above mentioned books about Venona; and they can compare secondary sources with primary sources they have read.

The class should discuss the interpretive nature of history and decide which historians seem to make a more convincing case regarding the Venona documents. Ask the students to comment on the nature of historical research. They should consider the fluid and changing nature of history as more evidence and different interpretations become available.

As they discuss the role of espionage in the history of the Cold War, ask them if Venona is even mentioned in their textbooks. Much of the historical evidence about Venona was made public in the late 1990s and in 2000. If their textbooks were printed after that time, then Venona should be there, but in many cases it will not be present. The question, of course, is why not? Here is a great opportunity for the teacher to discuss the writing of history and nature of historical research, as well as that of textbooks. Textbooks are painfully slow when it comes to making changes as new historical evidence and arguments are presented.

Ask the students to consider the following questions:
1. Which historical arguments and what evidence is included in their textbooks? What is left out?
2. Why are only some interpretations included? Should all points of view be in a textbook? Is that possible?

One useful assignment is to present students with nothing but primary sources from multiple perspectives and ask them what issues they would include in a textbook if they were in charge of writing one. Have them consider:
1. Which historical arguments and what evidence is included in their textbooks? What is left out?
2. What would they put in the book? What would they leave out? Why?

From personal experience, I can say that students enjoy and appreciate this exercise. Asking them what they would include in a history textbook gives them some ownership over what they are learning and it gives them a feel for trying to achieve balance and objectivity.
Further Reading

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


Endnotes


2. Romerstein and Breindel go on to emphasize that it was President Truman’s Executive Order 9835 which mandated loyalty and security checks, thus barring communists from government employment. Issued in March 1947, the order came three years before McCarthy became famous. Ibid., 454. This information can also be found in Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) and In Denial: Historians, Communism & Espionage (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), both by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr.


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On October 17, 1950, in the Grant County town of Hanover, New Mexico, workers at the Empire Zinc mine finished their shifts, formed a picket line, and began a fifteen-month strike. Represented by Local 890 of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill), the miners, overwhelmingly Mexican American, had voted to strike after reaching an impasse with the company over “collar-to-collar” pay (rather than paying only for the time workers spent at their individual work places inside the mine), lack of paid holidays, and the high number of job classifications (which allowed the company to reserve the lowest-paying jobs for Mexican Americans—the “Mexican wage”). In June 1951, after the strikers had shut down production for eight months, the company obtained an injunction against any further picketing. Wary of the mass jailings and massive fines that would result from violating the court order, yet not wanting to give up their strike, the workers reluctantly agreed to a novel idea proposed by several woman activists in Mine-Mill Ladies Auxiliary 209. Since they were not legally striking workers, the wives of strikers, as well as other women and children, would take over the picket line. For the next seven months, the women held the line in the face of violence from strikebreakers, mass arrests by the sheriff, and opposition from many of their own husbands, who were suddenly faced with the responsibilities of caring for children, washing clothes, and doing the dishes. In January 1952, the strikers returned to work with a new contract. They had failed to win their major demands, but did obtain significant pay increases that, in effect, undermined the Mexican wage. Several weeks later, Empire Zinc installed hot water plumbing in Mexican American workers’ houses—a major issue pushed by the women of these households (1).

At first glance, this story might seem far removed from the familiar history of the early Cold War—Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, or the hot war raging in Korea. And yet, Mine-Mill was no stranger to these controversies, as it was one of eleven national labor unions expelled in 1949–50 from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) for alleged Communist domination. Indeed, a substantial number of local, regional, and national leaders of Mine-Mill were CP members. These included Clinton Jencks, sent from the International to organize in New Mexico, as well as Chicano leaders of Local 890, such as Juan and Virginia Chacón. Other Local 890 members were heavily involved in a pioneering Mexican American civil rights organization—La Asociación Nacional México-Americana (ANMA)—in which Communists played a leading role (2). Moreover, ANMA was only the most recent incarnation of a longstanding radical tradition among Mexican Americans (3).

As if this was not controversy enough, the Empire Zinc strikers attracted the national attention of anticommunists in 1953 due to the production of a powerful film that told the story of their strike, highlighted the role of the picketing women, and featured workers and family members in many acting roles. The film was Salt of the Earth (1954), created by a trio of blacklisted Hollywood talent—Herbert

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**Figure 1.** The film *Salt of the Earth* (1954) chronicled a 1950–52 strike by Hanover, New Mexico zinc miners, members of Local 890 of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. Here, Local 890 activists gather at a national convention in 1953. Top row, left to right (those with speaking roles in the film in bold): Robert Kirker, Juan Chacón, Virginia Jencks, Germán du Luna, Virginia Chacón, Clorinda Alderette, Frank Alderette. Bottom row, left to right, Nick Castillo, Arturo Flores, Ernesto Velásquez, Clinton Jencks, Clinton Michael Jencks. (Courtesy of University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries)
Biberman (director), Michael Wilson (screenwriter), and Paul Jarrico (producer)—who had joined the Communist Party in the 1930s and now banded together to organize the Independent Productions Corporation (IPC). The story is set in “Zintown,” New Mexico and concerns a Mine-Mill strike at the “Delaware Zinc” company. The film’s narrative centers on Esperanza Quintero, played by professional Mexican actress Rosaura Revueltas, and her zinc miner and chief union steward husband Ramón Quintero, portrayed by Local 800’s Juan Chacón. In an early scene, Esperanza implores Ramón to include a demand for hot running water along with the men’s demands for mine safety and higher wages, which he dismisses. The relationship between Esperanza and Ramón—their conflicts, the inversion of their gender roles once she joins the women’s picket line, the crisis this presents, and the final positive resolution—forms the emotional core of Salt of the Earth. In addition to these two, a number of characters were played by activists in the union local and women’s auxiliary: Union president Charyly Vidal (Ernest Velásquez), Frank Barnes (Mine-Mill International organizer Clinton Jencks), Ruth Barnes (activist and wife of Clinton Jencks, Virginia Jencks), Teresa Vidal (Henrietta Williams), Luz Morales (Clorinda Alderette), Consuelo Ruiz (Angela Sánchez), and Sal Ruiz (Joe T. Morales), among others. A small group of professionals also shared the bill. Most notably, Will Geer of Grandpa Walton fame portrayed the evil sheriff.

On February 24, 1953, as filming proceeded in Grant County, U.S. Representative Donald L. Jackson (Rep-Calif.), a member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), delivered a speech on the floor of Congress that portrayed Salt as a dire threat to the nation. “This picture,” Jackson charged, “is deliberately designed to inflame racial hatreds and to depict the United States of America as the enemy of all colored peoples.” “If this picture is shown in Latin America, Asia, and India,” he warned, “it will do incalculable harm not only to the United States but to the cause of free people everywhere.” “In effect,” he concluded, “this picture is a new weapon for Russia” (4). Jackson’s speech was the opening salvo in a battle to obstruct the completion of Salt of the Earth that almost succeeded. The Grant County American Legion post distributed printed copies of Jackson’s speech to local residents. Anti-Mine-Mill residents formed a vigilante committee that carried out physical attacks on the film crew and cast (5). And the day after Jackson’s speech, Rosaura Revueltas was arrested on immigration charges, based on the technicality that she had failed to get her passport stamped when entering the U.S., and was deported before filming ended. (The last shots of her in the film were done in Mexico and the film had to be smuggled back into the U.S.). Finally, due to collaboration between Jackson, studio executives such as Howard Hughes, the American Legion, as well as the conservative Hollywood technicians’ union—the International Association of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE)—few Americans saw Salt of the Earth in the year of its release. In 1954, there were 13,000 movie theaters in the U.S. Only thirteen of them showed the film (6). This article focuses on three key scenes from Salt and offers a brief synopsis and historical discussion for each one. Over the past year, I have had the opportunity to present and discuss Salt of the Earth with two groups of secondary social studies teachers. They have helped me to select the scenes that would be most usable with a range of students, and have confirmed that the intertwined narratives of the Empire Zinc strike and Salt of the Earth, alongside excerpts of the film itself, offer a unique set of tools for instructors teaching about the Cold War (7). They help to illustrate how the Cold War was not only a global contest between the two superpowers, but was also a battle for the hearts and minds of working people inside the United States. Its outcome would determine what kind of nation America would be in the postwar era.

The Day of the Crisis: Synopsis (45:53–53:37)
The strike has now been on for several months. Members of the women’s auxiliary have been working in the union office, taking an increasingly active role in the strike. Then, Esperanza tells us, came “the day of the crisis”—the judge’s injunction to take down the picket line. “A Taft-Hartley injunction, they called it.” Frank Barnes, Sal Ruiz, and Charley Vidal huddle together to read the order. At the union meeting that night, Barnes explains that the strikers are stuck between a rock and a hard place. But “no matter how you decide,” he says, “the International will back you up, as it’s always backed you up. This is a democratic union. The decision is up to you.” Ramón speaks against ending the strike: “If we give up now, if we obey this rotten Taft-Hartley, we are fools and cowards. There is only one way, fight ‘em, fight ‘em all.” The men argue back and forth, all speaking in Spanish. Then up stands Teresa Vidal who proposes that women take over the picket line. Laughter from the men greets her suggestion. She argues back, to some applause. Luz asks in Spanish, as Esperanza translates, “what was worse—to hide behind a woman’s skirt or to go down on his knees before the boss?” Ramón speaks against the women’s picket line; Esperanza isn’t sure. Then, Esperanza stands up and says women should be able to vote considering that they will be carrying out the action. Since women cannot vote in the union local, the group votes to adjourn the meeting and reconvene as a community meeting with all adults voting. Esperanza votes for, Ramón against. The motion carries (8).

The Day of the Crisis: Context
This union meeting was indeed a turning point in the strike and in the role of the women, though, in reality, the idea for the women’s picket line had been developed earlier that day by Virginia Jencks, Virginia Chacón, and Aurora Chávez. Moreover, Clinton Jencks and another Mine-Mill official actively supported the proposal in the meeting. Debate went on much longer than portrayed in this scene—they did not reach a decision until about 2:30 a.m. As for the voting, Mine-Mill Ladies Auxiliary 209 members were entitled to vote on Local 890 matters, and they did so in this case. If they had not, it’s quite possible the idea would have been defeated. True to the film, Virginia’s husband Juan Chacón did vote no (9).

The description of the judge’s order as a “Taft-Hartley injunction” is a creative addition by the filmmakers; Judge Marshall’s order was a run-of-the-mill injunction based on state law. And yet, the inclusion of the federal Taft-Hartley Act in the film is not surprising. Passed in 1947, Taft-Hartley required that unions wishing to make use of National Labor Relations Board election procedures had to file affidavits certifying that its elected officials were not members of the Communist Party. While the CIO initially defied Taft-Hartley, by late 1947, it was enforcing compliance by its constituent unions. Mine-Mill was now under the gun. Due to its support for Independent Progressive Party candidate Henry Wallace in
the 1948 elections, its opposition to the Marshall Plan, and its continuing defiance of the Taft-Hartley Act, it was expelled in 1950. In 1949, Mine-Mill finally agreed to comply and International representative Clinton Jencks resigned from the Communist Party and then signed an affidavit in order to maintain his union role (10). Nonetheless, just weeks after Salt filming was completed in the spring of 1953, Jencks was arrested by the FBI and charged with falsifying his affidavit. A key government witness was former Communist Harvey Matusow, who swore that Jencks admitted to CP membership and told him Mine-Mill was striking to obstruct the Korean War effort. Later, Matusow changed his tune, publishing a spectacular confession that he had lied repeatedly on the witness stand. In 1957, a liberalizing U.S. Supreme Court reversed Jencks’s conviction, and established a rule—later codified by the U. S. Congress in the Jencks Act—that defendants had the right to examine written FBI informant reports used as evidence against them in court (11).

For the filmmakers, Taft-Hartley seems to stand in for the whole range of Cold War-influenced legislation that restricted the activities of Mine-Mill and its members. But aside from the two mentions of Taft-Hartley in this scene, there is virtually no other mention of the broader political context of the strike. The words “communist” or “communism,” while plentifully hurled at the strikers and their leaders in reality, never appear in the film. This absence is part of what led the New York Times to write that “the screen play was a let-down to anyone who had expected an inflammatory document” (12). In a fascinating bit of research, however, one scholar has found that the original script, which has never been published, contained explicit references to “Bolsheviks,” “Commies,” and the Korean War (13).

Women’s Picket Line: Synopsis (53:39–58:06)

Having won a majority of the vote, the women descend upon the Delaware Zinc mine entrance and form their picket line. Their roles reversed, the men now sit on the sidelines watching the women. I think they were afraid, afraid the women wouldn’t stand fast, or maybe afraid that they would.” Esperanza, along with some others, is “forbidden” to join the line. “The union don’t run my house,” Ramón tells her. “Those Anglo dames stirred you up to make fools of yourselves.”

In the face of the newly formed line, the smiling sheriff is unconcerned. “Forget it—they’ll scatter like quail,” he says to his deputies. The sheriff calmly gives the order to get the strikebreakers through and his deputies lead a caravan of cars directly toward the picket line in the middle of the road. Rather than scattering, the women form ranks, and the slowly moving cars run right into them, knocking them down. The crowed of women then goes into action. They drag the men out of the cars, including the sheriff’s deputies, push the cars away, and force the strikebreakers back. The men find it hard to stay out of the fight, but Teresa tells them to get back. “They’ll start shooting you,” she yells. The women reestablish the line. Then a deputy fires tear gas. Esperanza is watching this whole time, itching for a chance to get in. When she spies Teresa and another woman scrambling with a strikebreaker, she can’t take it anymore, hands the baby to Ramón and heads down the hill into the fray. Running to join Teresa, she takes off a shoe, and uses it to knock a gun out of the man’s hands. She is elated (14).

Women’s Picket Line: Context

The women’s picket was carefully organized, militant, and successful. Not only did wives of Empire strikers, such as Henrietta Williams and Virginia Chacón, walk the line; many women from other towns in Grant County also participated. When County Sheriff Leslie Goforth ordered 73 women arrested on June 16, another 300 women took their places (15)! The women and their children were jailed, their protests behind bars drew national attention, and they were soon released. While Judge Marshall did issue a subsequent ruling that the women were also covered by the injunction, months went by before the sheriff tried again to enforce the order. While the union was politically isolated from the CIO leadership and many AFL unions, the strike had broad support among Mexican Americans in New Mexico. This helped stay the hand of Governor Mechem who refrained, for several months, from using state police to reopen the mine.

It is also worth noting that the women on the Empire Zinc picket line flouted prevailing gender conventions in a more blatant way than is depicted in the film. Not only did women push cars, drag men out of them, and maintain their lines; they also jumped on cars, threw rocks at strikebreakers, and deployed various “domestic” items as weapons: knitting needles, pins, (rotten) eggs and chili peppers. Some dressed in more “masculine” or modern fashion, but adopted traditional dress for the film. Moreover, the women’s mobilization built on a longer history of wage work and activism, rather than springing only from their personal frustrations in the domestic sphere. The reluctance of the filmmakers to present these issues more honestly stemmed, in part, from the deep ambivalence of Mine-Mill’s members about the leading role of women. Analyzing the Mine-Mill union newspaper coverage of the strike, Alicia Camacho has concluded that “Mine-Mill unionists struck an uneasy balance between promoting women’s labor activism...
and containing their problematic militancy to the domestic front of struggle” (16).

Men Hanging Laundry: Synopsis (1:09:50–1:11:44)
This scene features two next-door neighbors hanging laundry—Ramón Quintero and Antonio Morales (Luz’s husband, played by Charles Coleman). Esperanza, Luz, and dozens of other picketers remain locked up in county jail and have been making life hell for the sheriff and his deputies. Ramón is also looking after little Estella, who is playing with her friend from next door, and newborn baby Juanito, whom Ramón has just retrieved from the jailed Esperanza in a particularly poignant moment from the previous scene. We first see Ramón, who is clearly tired and agitated. Joining him on the other side of the fence is Antonio, with his basket of wet laundry. “Como va?” asks Antonio, to which Ramón exclaims, “Esto no tiene fin! (This never ends!). Three hours just to get enough water to wash this stuff. I’m telling you something. If this strike is ever settled, which I doubt, I’ll never go back to work for that company unless they install hot running water for us. It should have been a union demand from the beginning.” At that moment, baby Juanito screams, Ramón throws down the clothes in disgust, and gives the baby back his bottle. This exchange follows:

Antonio: It’s like Charley Vidal says, two kinds of slavery—wage slavery and domestic slavery. The “woman question” he calls it.

Ramón: The woman question?
Antonio: The problem—what to do about it?
Ramón: What does he want to do about ’em?
Antonio: He says give ’em equality. Equality in jobs, equality in the home, and also, sex equality.
Ramón: What do you mean, sex equality? (menacingly)
Antonio: You know, lo que es bueno para el hombre es bueno para la mujer (17).

Men Hanging Laundry: Context
This scene is one of the most striking in the whole film. Considering that the second wave of the feminist movement was still a decade in the offing—to say nothing of a specifically Chicana feminism—the forthright discussion of job discrimination, the politics of housework, and the sexual double standard was far ahead of its time. And yet, historians have begun to recapture the pre-history of the 1960s feminist movement in ways that make the appearance of the laundry-hanging Juan Chacón a little less surprising. For one thing, later mainstream feminist organizations, such as the National Organization of Women, built upon activism of an earlier generation of women, many of them with experience in the labor movement, the Communist Party, and CP-influenced groups such as the Congress of American Women (18). Betty Friedan’s earliest expressions of feminism came not in the The Feminine Mystique (1963) but in pamphlets she wrote for the “Communist-dominated” United Electrical Workers in the 1940s (19). The fact that these stories were buried and forgotten for decades speaks to the power of Cold War politics to silence history. Thus, we should expect that unions such as Mine-Mill with a vision of a broader, socially-conscious unionism (whatever its limits) would have begun to take up “the woman question.”

At the same time, the transformation of consciousness and gender relations illustrated in this last scene was a highly uneven and partial process. Some of the women reported real changes in their marriage relationships. Some gained the confidence to escape from abusive husbands. One woman said that she felt she had grown “ten feet tall.” And some couples grew closer and developed a more equal partnership. At the same time, other couples slipped back into the old ways. As historian Ellen Baker has shown, the negative extreme was the case of Chana Montoya, whose husband had served as president of Local 890. On her initiative, both had joined the Communist Party in the late 1940s. A year after Salt premiered, and after years of abuse, she divorced him, moved to Los Angeles, got a job and started a new life with her seven children. A number of years later, he followed her there and after failing to persuade her to return to New Mexico, shot her to death. In his trial, he justified his action in the name of defending their children from communism. On his release from prison, Montoya took his own life (20).

Conclusion
The Montoya story is far less uplifting than the ending of Salt of the Earth. In the film’s last scene, Delaware Zinc’s last-ditch effort to derail the strike by mass evictions is met by united resistance from the men and women of the entire mining region. The clear implication is that the strikers have won. And yet, combining the complex historical context of the film with its content is essential. The Empire Zinc strikers did win a limited victory. The film offers us a certain kind of historical truth. But by placing the film in historical context, we can
better appreciate just how the various battles raging in communities small and large all over the United States—over racial segregation, class inequality, and gender relations—were enmeshed in the politics of the Cold War.

**Endnotes**


7. The film is available for download in several different formats at: <http://www.archive.org/details/salt_of_the_earth>.


15. Baker, 125.


17. The colloquial phrase in English is “What is good for the goose is good for the gander.”


Many of our students would rather be anywhere else on earth than in our classrooms. With the aid of the latest technologies, they have developed skills that allow them to be physically present, but mentally in another world, taking on a series of other identities—email correspondent, movie viewer, photo editor, social network commentator, and consumer, among others. Rather than despair in the face of this behavior, however, teachers can channel those escapist desires for educational purposes. This historical simulation on the 1945 Yalta Conference keeps students in the classroom but encourages and, indeed, requires them to take on new roles. Students talk, act, and walk like world political leaders, all the while paying careful consideration to an event that shaped the direction of world history for the next forty-five years.

The aftermath of World War II is critical to an understanding of how the Cold War developed. As the Allied powers approached victory over Japan, Germany, and Italy, nations began diplomatic negotiations with each other which would profoundly shape the contours of the Cold War. At Yalta, the leaders of the three major Allied powers—President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, and Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union—met in February 1945 to discuss the postwar world. These leaders sought to defeat Nazi Germany as rapidly as possible, but they were also concerned about the future. Anticipating conflict with each other, American and Soviet leaders sought to establish a postwar world in their own best interests, while the British, uncomfortable as a second rate power, hoped to protect their power base and so emerge as the leader of a powerful postwar western Europe. Many Cold War disputes have their origins in the agreements and disagreements at Yalta.

National Standards
Era 8: The Great Depression and World War II (1929–1945)
Standard 3B: The student understands World War II and how the Allies prevailed.
Era 9: Postwar United States (1945 to early 1970s)
Standard 2A: The student understands the international origins and domestic consequences of the Cold War.

Standards in Historical Thinking:
Standard 5 of the Historical Issues-Analysis and Decision-Making

Student Objectives
1. Connect the historical context of the relationships and previous disputes among the three countries with negotiations at the Yalta conference.
2. Recognize how historical context shaped the national goals and negotiation strategies of each country.
3. Assess each nation’s relative success in achieving both its short-term and long-term goals.
4. Consider the merits of those goals with the hindsight of the ensuing historical events.
5. The fates of smaller European countries and European colonies in Asia and Africa were influenced by the decisions of the three leaders at the Yalta Conference. Speculate about how the dynamics and outcomes of the Yalta Conference might have been different had they all been included in negotiations.
6. Experience the challenges and skills needed for effective negotiations.

Background
The Grand Alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union during World War II resulted not from a natural affinity or shared worldview, but from their mutual antipathy for the Axis powers. Tensions resulting from the political, social, and economic incompatibility of capitalism and communism were accentuated by mistrust based on previous events. The United States and Great Britain, for example, had invaded Soviet Russia with thousands of troops thirty
years earlier during the Russian Civil War to fight against the Bolshevik Red Army. These countries coordinated efforts with the White Army, which represented a coalition of Russian groups opposed to the Bolshevik government led by Lenin. The U.S. and British motivation was opposition to the spread of revolutionary socialist ideas and other political, military, and economic concerns. Then, during the 1930s, they ignored Soviet warnings about the threat Hitler posed to world peace and the confrontations occurring on the Soviet Union’s eastern border with Japan. On the other hand, the Soviets reneged on Russia’s treaty commitments near the end of World War I by making a separate peace with Germany and failing to honor repayment of debt to other European countries. In 1939, on the eve of World War II, the Soviets signed a treaty with Hitler for the dissection of Poland, and then annexed other countries along the Baltic Sea. Yet throughout the early stages of World War II, the animosity and distrust between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union was mitigated by their mutual need to defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan. The open antagonism was temporarily subsumed to facilitate joint military operations.

The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union held a trio of conferences during the second half of the war: the first was at Tehran, Iran in late November and early December 1943; the second was hosted at Yalta, the Crimea, in Soviet Ukraine, in early February 1945; and the final conference was held in Potsdam, in occupied Germany, during late July and early August 1945. The previous disputes and competitions openly reemerged among the leaders during the second and third conferences. For purposes of this history simulation, the focus will be the second conference at Yalta.

A group that was conspicuously absent from the conferences were leaders from countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, China, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states, all of which experienced long-term consequences from the decisions at these conferences by the trio of Allied leaders. Absent too were representatives from the peoples of the European colonial empires of Africa and Asia, which became battlegrounds during the Cold War. This same pattern also occurred following World War I, when the major Allied leaders made unilateral decisions that contributed to conditions

Figure 2. Allied leaders discuss the end of the war and the ensuing peace during their 1945 meeting in Yalta. Stalin (seated back left), Churchill (seated front left), and Roosevelt (seated back right with Admiral William Leahy and General George C. Marshall to his left) each came to the negotiation table with his own particular national and global goals, beyond their common objective of defeating Germany and Japan. (Courtesy of Library of Congress)
conducive to World War II. As the class moves through this simulation, be sure to consider the perspectives of these smaller states and the impact that they felt from the actions of the three Allied powers.

The Yalta Conference took place only weeks after German military commanders used their last reserves in a desperate, failed offensive known to history as the “Battle of the Bulge.” The Soviet, American, and British armies were now poised on the borders of Germany with the outcome of the continental war no longer in doubt. On the other hand, Japan still controlled vast areas of China, Southeast Asia, the East Indies, and numerous islands in the Pacific Ocean. Japanese soldiers refused to surrender regardless of the circumstances, and American officials expected a long and terribly bloody campaign to defeat them. At the same time, the Americans were secretly working on an atomic bomb, but it would not be successfully tested until five months after Yalta.

The military situation in Europe gave the Soviet Union an advantageous negotiating position at the Yalta Conference in contrast to the United States and Great Britain. German success in the early stages of the Battle of the Bulge was embarrassing to the Americans, but, more importantly, it delayed American and British plans to invade Germany. These attacks were just beginning as the conference commenced and the major obstacle of the Rhine River was expected to delay the Anglo-American advance. In contrast, during the three weeks prior to the conference, the Soviet army had raced 250 miles through Poland to within forty miles of Berlin by the time the Yalta Conference began. They no longer faced any major obstacles in their effort to defeat Germany on the eastern front.

**Procedures**

This simulation requires fifty minutes. It creates multiple Yalta conferences in one classroom by dividing the students into smaller groups. As a result, the instructor and students can compare and contrast the outcomes of the various conferences when they reconvene later in the class period. By acting simultaneously and independently of one another, diversity in the negotiation process and outcomes naturally emerges due to the unique dynamics and personalities of each small group.

Figure 3. At Yalta, the Allies agreed that countries liberated from Axis rule would have the chance for self-determination. In practice, this proved difficult. In Greece, the previous year, the defeat of the German occupation unleashed a civil war between Communist-led resistance fighters and conservative forces. After helping crush the Communist forces, the British propped up the brutal, corrupt monarchist government of Constantine Tsaldaris, which faced a renewed guerilla campaign in 1946 by the Communist-led Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), a group of whom pose in this 1947 photo. Although Stalin gave virtually no support to the Greek rebels, with the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, the U.S. took over the British role, and sent military advisors to Greece, setting the pattern for counterinsurgency warfare for decades to come. (Courtesy of Library of Congress)
The instructor initiates the activity with a brief historical background relating the simulation to previous content in the class. The simulation works best if it immediately follows a unit focused on World War II and the impact of historical events from World War I through the interwar time period. While I found it useful to provide a handout that summarized some of the major historical events that affected the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union (Handout #1 is a sample), it would be best to create a handout based on the actual content covered in the course in order to reactivates what they had previously learned. The handout should be distributed as an assigned reading at the end of the previous class period or posted on the Internet several days in advance: students have reported higher satisfaction with this simulation if they had the opportunity to study the handout and consider the dynamics of the negotiation process beforehand. The undergraduate students who tested this simulation requested explanation of the handout items that presented unfamiliar information. This protocol might be less important for upper-division or graduate students in history.

After the background briefing for the students, the instructor uses a method to divide the students into smaller groups. The activity generates more energy and conversation if the small groups are composed of six students so that each is more likely to actively participate. Each Yalta Conference will have three countries represented: Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Each country could have one, two, or three diplomats depending on class size, student abilities, and instructor goals. Desks or tables should be arranged to facilitate negotiation within each conference and to minimize distraction from other conferences in the room. The negotiation handouts (#2, #3, and #4), which provide the goals and points awarded for each country, are distributed by the instructor only to the diplomat(s) of the country specified, since they contain the private negotiation goals of each Allied nation.

After the instructor has distributed the handouts, the diplomats from each country meet privately to consider the relative importance of their country’s goals as identified in their assigned handout (either handout #2, #3, or #4) and the reason for that judgment. This will aid their decisions regarding which goals to argue more forcefully for and which to concede. After five minutes of internal discussion, the diplomats of each country convene in their small group and negotiate the various issues with the diplomats from the other two countries in their conference. The diplomat teams should be specific in their reasons to advance their priorities and justify reluctance to concede issues to other countries. If necessary during the proceedings, each of the diplomatic teams could caucus privately for a few minutes to reevaluate the negotiation process and perhaps change their strategies and priorities. The small group discussions should last approximately thirty minutes. Each conference must reach a consensus agreement since diplomacy is not decided by majority rule. During these negotiations, the instructor moves from conference to conference; facilitating discussions, providing information, clarifying procedures, and suggesting compromises. The instructor makes periodic announcements concerning the remaining time for the activity to help the small groups finish at the same time. During the last few minutes of the small group interaction, each diplomat team uses the scoring table at the bottom of their handout to identify the final point total earned for their country. For each negotiation objective, points are scored if the team’s objective became part of the negotiated outcome. If the objective is not included in the final settlement, no points are scored for that item. The diplomat teams then share their scores with the diplomats from the other countries at their table to discover which earned the highest point total.

After the scores are calculated for each small Yalta Conference group, the class reconvenes into a large group for a fifteen-minute debriefing of the simulation experience and deeper examination of the issues. Each Yalta Conference team quickly reports their agreement, the points scored by each country, and one lesson learned during the negotiation process. In the case of a very large class, there may only be time for a sample of the small groups to make a public report. Using Handout #1, the instructor assesses the agreements of each conference, compares them with the actual agreements at the Yalta Conference, and leads a class discussion utilizing several of the questions provided under Discussion #1. Time permitting, a second discussion could focus on the long-term results of the Yalta Conference by utilizing Handouts #5–7 and the information and questions provided under Discussion #2.

### Handout Three: Short- and Long-Term Achievements at Yalta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference Agreement</th>
<th>Points Achieved at Yalta</th>
<th>Points Achieved by End of the Cold War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishing the United Nations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing that the Soviets will enter the war against Japan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a democratic Eastern Europe friendly to the Soviet Union</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making no statement on European colonial empires</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placing China on the United Nations Security Council with veto power</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing to divide Germany into two countries</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeing to exact German war reparations</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score Achieved at Yalta: 45
Score Achieved by End of the Cold War: -15

All handouts needed for this simulation are available for free download on the OAH Magazine of History website for this issue: <http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/v24n4/>. 
Actual Agreements at Yalta

The actual agreements initially negotiated at Yalta included the following:
1. Bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment.
2. Jointly occupy and administer Germany by establishing occupation zones.
3. Establish the United Nations with each major power having veto power.
4. The major powers are United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China.
5. The Soviets keep the territory that they had acquired in 1939–40.
6. Establish democratic Eastern European governments that are friendly to the Soviets.
7. Soviet Union will declare war on Japan, ninety days after VE day. Notably, no agreement was made concerning war reparations or European empires.

Discussion One
1. What were the goals of each country at the Yalta Conference?
2. Which goals did you achieve in the Yalta Conference simulation?
3. Which goals were actually achieved at the real Yalta Conference?
4. How important were these agreements to the future of Europe?
5. To what extent do these decisions reflect global concerns?
6. To what extent do they reflect nationalistic interests?
7. Whose views were represented or ignored at Yalta?
8. To what extent did personalities affect your simulation?
9. To what extent did personalities affect diplomacy during the war?
10. Was the Yalta Conference successful? In what ways?
11. Did the agreements resolve, ignore, or create divisive issues?

Discussion Two
1. The actual Yalta agreements were favorable to the American and British points of view, but the eventual results were favorable to the Soviets. How can you account for this discrepancy?
2. The United States’ achievements at Yalta included a Soviet pledge to enter the Pacific theater of the war and a seat for China on the U.N. Security Council. What historical developments changed American attitudes toward those two achievements? To what extent did historical events change American attitudes toward other aspects of the Yalta agreements?
3. The agreement that countries in Eastern Europe would have democratic governments friendly to the Soviet Union was impossible to achieve in Poland and Romania. Centuries of warfare with Russia meant any freely elected government in those countries would be anti-Soviet. How did this situation contribute to postwar difficulties? How did the United States and the Soviet Union react to this situation?
4. The American dilemma over colonialism resulted in many ambiguities and contradictions in American foreign policy toward the colonial territories/emerging nations in Asia and Africa. Which independence movements did the United States support or oppose? What was the most significant issue in determining the United States’ position? How would the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia have been different if America supported Vietnamese independence from France rather than opposed it as an expansion of communism?

Lessons Learned from Field Testing

The history simulation was used with lower-division, undergraduate college students during the summer of 2010. Instructor observations and student comments revealed several helpful suggestions to get the most out of the simulation process. It is critical to have background information of the three Allied nations before and during World War II. Students preferred to have the Yalta historical overview (Handout #1) provided either during the preceding class period or posted several days ahead of the history simulation on the Internet for review. To help propel the discussion, the instructor could model several negotiation strategies during the initial overview of the simulation. Common themes from the student comments included:
1. They learned more about the complexity and difficulty of the negotiation process.
2. They looked at the common issues through the viewpoint of the other country.
3. They wanted more background information and time to gain the most from the simulation.

Several suggestions from the instructor who facilitated the simulation included:
1. The instructor should embed the background knowledge needed for the simulation (and the specific information contained in sample Handout #1) intentionally within the class sessions that precede it.
2. The instructor should announce the upcoming history simulation and its general activity outline for students in previous class sessions to encourage them to collect and organize information useful for the simulation.

One of the challenges with any simulation is limiting the number of variables and the content to facilitate the most effective learning experience for the students within the given time period. Other history teachers could vary this simulation to explore issues not addressed in this current form. For example, one could experiment with adding diplomatic representation by one or more of the other countries, such as China, France, or Poland; introduce one or more representatives of various coalitions of countries (e.g., currently occupied by Soviet troops, governments in exile, countries inside or outside of Europe); and/or consider modifications for the simulation for use with graduate history students.

Another layer to explore is the assessment of “success” of the Yalta Conference agreements. Instead of, or in addition to, the current focus
on external implications, examine internal domestic results of the Yalta agreements within the countries. Examining domestic strife and conflict, attributable indirectly or directly to the Yalta agreements, within Great Britain, Greece, and the United States would add a nuanced examination and interpretation of the events. Depending upon the type of course for which the simulation is used (first-year, upper-division, or graduate; general elective history survey, undergraduate course for the major, or graduate history seminar), many variations are possible. Useful simulations immerse students in historical events, empower them to engage difficult issues, promote examination of the consequences of each decision, help students to discover lessons that inform the historical event, and hopefully guide their future actions.

Further Readings

David Ghere was an associate professor of history in the College of Education and Human Development at the University of Minnesota. He taught American and World history at the college level for twenty-three years and authored a variety of publications on Native American history, developmental education, and active learning teaching methods. He also conducted teacher workshops and maintained a website of classroom simulations he created at <http://www.historicalsimulations.com>. He passed away in January 2010. Professor Ghere exhibited great care both as a respected scholar and as an effective teacher. He is greatly missed by his family, colleagues, and students.
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