

American foreign policy
Studies in intellectual history

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The strange career of nation-building as a concept in US foreign policy

The people of the South should be the last Americans to expect indefinite continuity of their institutions and social arrangements. Other Americans have less reason to be prepared for sudden change and lost causes. Apart from Southerners, Americans have enjoyed a historical continuity that is unique among modern peoples. The stream of national history, flowing down from seventeenth-century sources, reaches a fairly level plain in the eighteenth century. There it gathered mightily in volume and span from its tributaries, but it continued to flow like the Mississippi over an even bed between relatively level banks.

Southern history, on the other hand, took a different turn in the nineteenth century. At intervals the even bed gave way under the stream, which sometimes plunged over falls or swirled through rapids. These breaks in the course of Southern history go by the names of slavery and secession, independence and defeat, emancipation and reconstruction, redemption and reunion. Some are more precipitous and dramatic than others. Some result in sheer drops and falls, others in narrows and rapids. The distance between them, and thus the extent of smooth sailing and stability, varies a great deal.¹

These two opening paragraphs from C. Vann Woodward's monumental 1955 book the *Strange Career of Jim Crow* capture the simultaneous invisibility and presence of race in American history over the course of three centuries. On the one hand, the history of the United States is a continuing story of liberty, capitalism and democracy. On the other hand, the hatred and violence of racial prejudice disrupt this promising story and expose its many contradictions, limitations and inhumane costs. One can think of Barack Obama's election to the US presidency as a continuation of this pattern: a promising democratic narrative accompanied by degrading hatred and violence. For Woodward, the American South was (and it remains) the region of the country where the clash of duelling historical perspectives is most evident. In these terms, it is the region with the strangest career.²

Similar things can be said for the long history of American foreign policy, especially as it relates to the Global South – what geographers called the Third World a generation ago. From the American War for Independence in the late eighteenth century through to the ‘War on Terror’ more than two centuries later, ideas of self-governance, popular sovereignty and open trade have driven American foreign policy. These ideas underpin foundational policy statements from Washington’s Farewell Address in 1796, to Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918, to George W. Bush’s Second Inaugural Address of 2005. Each defined American principles and power as alternatives to tyranny and empire. Each anticipated a progressive world where diverse societies would come to look, at least in their political and economic organisation, more like the United States.³

When pressed by foreign challengers and domestic critics, the only alternative to some form of nation-building that American leaders could imagine was disaster for the United States. For Americans, a world of competing systems has always seemed perilous. Balances of power and international structures for cooperation have always appeared unreliable. That was the interpretation of the First World War shared by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt – the perception that continual great power competition breeds war. Wilson and Roosevelt sought to tame the wilds of the international system by making it operate in ways more like the American system, with the United States at the centre, of course. Wilson and Roosevelt sought to avoid future wars by making societies – friend and foe alike – follow basic American principles for democracy and free market exchange.⁴

As Woodward explains, the ubiquitous disappointments and deviations from principle have not diminished American resolve. Even as he withdrew US forces from two unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Barack Obama affirmed American nation-building hopes. Although he rejected unilateral American military occupations of foreign societies, President Obama remained committed to encouraging and, when necessary, forcing reforms in governments that depart from ‘civil’ assumptions about self-government, openness and security. This was especially the case when Americans confronted a new challenge to their vision of liberal democracy and regional stability from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The brutality of ISIS symbolised a deeper evil: extreme anti-modernism and anti-secularism fused with anti-Americanism.

In the seminal foreign policy speech of his second term, delivered at the US Military Academy on 28 May 2014, President Obama rejected ‘realist’ suggestions that American foreign policy should focus on core material interests and abandon its broader, more problematic ideological agenda. ‘I believe’, the President explained, ‘that a world of greater freedom and tolerance is not only a moral imperative, it also helps to keep us safe.’ President

Obama echoed his predecessors in affirming an 'indispensable' world leadership role for the United States:

America's support for democracy and human rights goes beyond idealism – it is a matter of national security. Democracies are our closest friends and are far less likely to go to war. Economies based on free and open markets perform better and become markets for our goods. Respect for human rights is an antidote to instability and the grievances that fuel violence and terror.⁵

What a strange career for American foreign policy ideals! How can they remain so strong, even among those who see their failures in places like Iraq and Afghanistan? The criticisms of President Obama circulate primarily around the application of these ideals, not their articulation or importance.⁶ Like the views of race analysed by C. Vann Woodward, the assumptions about purpose and principle in American foreign policy are sufficiently protean to bend and adjust in different times, but endure in their core influence on decision-makers. They are the basic parameters for the American global imagination. They are the bedrocks on which Americans build toward the world they expect to resemble their own.

Throughout their history and into the present, Americans have shown a remarkable (perhaps stubborn) capacity to support the frequently contradictory urges toward national self-interest and democratic transformation at the same time. Both sentiments are sincerely believed. For most leaders and citizens they are two sides of the same coin. When they obviously contradict, as in the many dictatorial regimes the United States has defended, then Americans believe the trade-off is temporary. When popular groups assert control over formerly repressive regimes, including repressive regimes the United States has supported, Americans tend to side with the revolutionaries. We saw this most recently in the 'Arab Spring' revolts of 2010–11.⁷

Contradictions between material self-interests and ideological preferences do not detract from the importance of both phenomena. It is their co-dependence as true belief, not hypocrisy, that defines the repeated idealism of American power in action. Just as nineteenth-century slave-holders seriously believed in freedom, twenty-first-century advocates of American primacy embrace democratic ideals. Contradictions reinforce faith, and they encourage an aspiration to synthesis between ideals and interests in a predicted future.

The historical teleology of American nation-building

The strange career of American international ideas includes countless debates about policy, political party and ideology, but it replicates similar 'end of history' expectations. One can read claims about an end to 'normal'

history in the words of Washington, Wilson, Bush, Obama and most other American leaders. They acknowledge the messy and complex elements of past international behaviour, but they assert that the United States can transcend, improve, simplify and ultimately redeem an unsatisfactory inheritance. This is the essence of American exceptionalism – the claim to stand above history. The popularity of Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history' essay in the United States during the late twentieth century captured this post-historical element of the American foreign policy faith.⁸

The post-historical presumption is what has led many observers to emphasise the millennial streak in American thinking. The United States has fought its wars to end all wars. It has invested in foreign societies to raise them to what Americans perceive as a mature level of development. Washington has advocated for democratic and capitalist governance as the only viable system for peace and prosperity. The keywords of 'democratisation', 'civilisation' and 'development' have recurred throughout the history of American foreign policy. They have gone together as a triad for the American vision of well-maintained nation-states in a world imperilled by disorder (anarchy) or tyranny (empire). The keywords served as building blocks and touchstones for an American-led alternative to inherited international history.⁹

American foreign policy thinking has been post-historical and decontextualised. The particularities of a specific culture, geography or ethnic mix matter only in tactics, and not as strategic goals for US leaders imagining global trends toward common nation-building. The universalism of the American project is striking in its asserted 'opportunity for all', and also in its homogeneity of expectations for the behaviour and outlook of non-American citizens. American foreign policy, in this sense, replays the Republican universalism about free institutions and labour that Northerners brought to the post-Civil War South, according to C. Vann Woodward. In both contexts – at home and abroad – American universalism has always been remarkably limited in its range of accepted opinion. It has been idealistic and inclusive, but also self-interested and incapable of addressing local diversity. Making freedom real for challenging and unique circumstances has been very difficult for Americans thinking in universal terms. Americans embrace diversity, but they seek ultimate universality. The frame for policy debate has therefore been quite narrow. That has not changed in the twenty-first century.¹⁰

The mechanisms producing (and enforcing) this historical teleology have differed greatly from one era to another, but a common nation-building vision has exerted strong and consistent influence on each generation of US policymakers. American leaders have imagined a legible world of nation-states like their own, emerging from empire, anarchy or other conditions in-between. Scholar David Hendrickson calls this the position of 'union', meaning a belief

in the political legitimacy of government institutions that represent an identifiable nation of people in a distinct territorial setting.¹¹ Political scientist Daniel Deudney looks back to a longer tradition of 'republican' security theory in the classical world that, filtered through the American founders, invests authority in governing institutions that ensure order against violence (external and internal) and protect basic citizen interests.¹²

Drawing on Hendrickson, Deudney and, and others, I have argued that the experience of 'union' and 'republic' in early American history became codified in a default American repertoire for nurturing familiar-looking nation-states in foreign spaces, especially during moments of threat and uncertainty. From the American Civil War through to interventions in the Philippines, Germany, Vietnam and Afghanistan, one can see a pattern of American efforts to create national identities and modern representative states that had previously experienced deeply contested and divergent histories. American actions have almost always included military force, but they have extended into economic aid, legal advice and cultural influence as well. These nation-building efforts have produced a very mixed record, including startling successes in Western Europe and Japan after 1945, abject failures in places like Vietnam, and many results in-between.¹³

Although some American leaders (including presidents Herbert Hoover and George W. Bush) have sought to depart from this inherited nation-building programme, they have found themselves returning to this same vision when they have most needed a policy response for rising threats. Nation-building is so deeply rooted in the American psyche and political rhetoric that it re-emerges, like a comfortable and familiar song, during moments of uncertainty and confusion. Nation-building is indeed part of the national anthem: the self-proclaimed 'land of the free and the home of the brave' forged in a war against empire.¹⁴

Based on their own experiences at home, Americans have trouble imagining a just and stable international political order that looks like anything but their own system of governance and representation. Despite the popularity of cultural relativism and multicultural thinking, the dominant model for understanding the 'other' remains American-centred in the United States. This applies to academia as much as politics and economy. Dorothy Ross has shown how the development of the social sciences, key contributors to policy and higher education in the twentieth-century United States, drew explicitly on presumptions of American civic nationalism, democratic governance and capitalist acquisition as norms for social development.¹⁵ Peter Novick and David Brown have extended this analysis into the development of history and other more humanistic fields of inquiry, where presentist familiarities consistently trumped 'objective' examinations of other times and places.¹⁶

When Americans compare themselves to others, they almost inevitably see themselves in others, rather than the other way around. This a paradox for a country composed of so many recent immigrant groups, but it shows the power of the nation's constructed civic identity. Americans cannot define themselves by blood, by language, by education, or even by material circumstances. The ethnic diversity and economic inequality of the country's population make these categories too limiting. Instead, Americans define themselves by their reverence for a set of political economic institutions and practices that compose the United States as a system of governance. Most citizens see flaws in these institutions and practices, but they hold tight to them as the sources for American greatness. That is the paradox of the Tea Party – anti-government, but triumphal about the American system. Free elections and free markets, for all their distortions, create an orderly American self-image. They are the starting points for all serious thinking about change at home and abroad.¹⁷

Almost by definition, then, Americans identify their political-economic history as *the* political-economic future for the world. This is a matter of faith – a national creed as deep as constitutional democracy in the American language and imagining of politics. It has a bible (the Constitution), a set of prophets (the Founders) and a high priesthood (Supreme Court justices and various legal and policy experts). Americans are pragmatic profit-seekers, but they are, more fundamentally, faithful believers in a Second Coming of their own Founding Moment around the world. They re-enact this faith with every domestic election and every foreign intervention – moments when the words of the Founders and their assumptions about nation-building are newly espoused, even in the most inopportune circumstances.¹⁸

The American promotion of a particular nation-building vision, at home and abroad, connects different periods and people in American history. The national creed is deeply and widely held, often advanced by traditional outsiders – including Henry Kissinger and Barack Obama – whose own place in American society is contested. It gives them belonging. It also excludes others – and that is C. Vann Woodward's point about the 'strange career'. The ideals of democracy and nation-building that define an alternative American political agenda for social improvement have repeatedly justified the use of force and the deprivation of local rights. This phenomenon, Woodward argues, is not hypocrisy but an integral element of American politics. The self-justifying pursuit of better politics, at home and abroad, gives licence for the use of various 'extraordinary measures' to keep dangerous populations in check, to allocate precious resources for productive purposes and to guide inexperienced people in the correct behaviour. Nation-building implies destroying whatever came before. Nation-building means forcing people to be free, on American terms.¹⁹

The victims of nation-building

C. Vann Woodward's *Strange Career* made the case that the experiences of African Americans in the South were not an aberration from American political development, but instead an integral part of it. The enforcement of constitutional democracy and free market capitalism after 1865 contributed to the separate but unequal treatment of former slaves. 'Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men' did little for those most heavily constrained in the exercise of their newfound freedom. A century later, the Civil Rights Movement used claims to democracy and economic opportunity to challenge segregation, but the movement, by necessity, reaffirmed the basic institutions of governance in the region. African Americans gained greater access to American wealth and governance than ever before, but equality across racial and other groups remained unfulfilled. The nature of nation-building in the South privileged property, law, economic opportunity and political sovereignty over other values, including equal treatment. The nature of nation-building in the South created more expansive governance as it reaffirmed many old exclusions based on race, wealth, gender, education and health. Woodward acknowledged this in later editions of his great work.²⁰

The same pattern fits American nation-building in the greater Global South, especially since 1945. The United States has intervened repeatedly in countries as diverse as Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, Chile, Indonesia, the Philippines, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria to overthrow regimes that appeared threatening to American definitions of democracy and capitalism. The perceived threats have come from anti-democratic ideologies, including communism, Islamism and, more frequently, militant nationalism. The perceived threats have also reflected economic preferences that violated free market logics, including import-substitution, state ownership of capital and nationalisation of industry. In all of these cases, and in many others, American economic interests in resource and market access have aligned quite well with assumptions about nation-building. Societies that violate American images of good governance have also challenged American economic interests. That insight provided the foundation for William Appleman Williams's classic argument that the 'open door' – trade and governance on American terms – has driven American foreign policy since the growth of US power in the late nineteenth century.²¹

Historians have examined the many local costs of American interventions in the Global South, as well as the long-term damage to the United States. American leaders have been responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths. They have disrupted countless local cultures and damaged millions of acres of land. The most modern technology has often produced the least liveable consequences.²² The abject poverty of a country like Haiti is a

testament to the failure of repeated American nation-building efforts, especially on an island so close to the United States.²³

A high proportion of the victims of American nation-building activities have included men and women of non-white races. That is not a coincidence. Although race has not always driven American decision-making, American citizens have been more willing to accept the suffering of people who look different from themselves, or at least the white-skinned American image of themselves. In their efforts to build democratic and capitalist nations that will secure the American imagining of a peaceful world, American citizens have found it tolerable to discount the suffering of non-white peoples in pursuit of an allegedly higher purpose. When the victims are white – especially in Europe and North America – it has been harder for Americans to discount the suffering. During the 1970s the simultaneous American outpouring of sympathy for East European dissidents and the relative silence of US leaders about apartheid in South Africa captured this prejudice.²⁴

The relationship between race and nation-building abroad echoes the relationship at home. In the post-Civil War era, federal and state officials could easily justify rebuilding the damaged Southern parts of the United States on the backs of suffering African Americans – even though the war was fought in large part to free them from slavery. The new investments in industrial farms and factories replaced the plantation economy with modern sources of wealth-creation that required a continuing supply of low-wage labour, often provided by former slaves and their descendants. Federal and local law enforcement also developed new techniques to maintain order through controlled violence that made the South an orderly post-war region, with heavy physical costs for African Americans and other minorities who suffered repeated lynchings and, by the early twenty-first century, one of the highest incarceration rates in the entire world.²⁵

Americans turned the backward Confederacy into a modern and prosperous Southern region. That was a great success of nation-building, unparalleled in most other societies after a bloody civil war. Nation-building in the South, however, exploited many non-white citizens as mistreated labour. They were the chief victims of post-Civil War nation-building and their victimhood was distressingly tolerable for most mainstream Americans, at least until a century later. That was a key point of C. Vann Woodward's *Strange Career*. Jim Crow racism made the New South possible, just as international racism made new nations conceivable for American foreign policy.²⁶

American state-building carried the same racial baggage abroad as it did at home. It meant democracy and wealth-creation for Americans and their local allies. It meant repression and impoverishment for those who lost access to political power and economic resources as a result of American interventions. These contradictory responses explain how American policies

can be judged so differently by diverse groups at the same time. The contradictory perspectives also explain why it is so difficult for Americans to understand the negative responses to their nation-building efforts, especially from citizens with different racial backgrounds.

American nation-building grows out of deeply held domestic beliefs about democracy and capitalism. These beliefs are based on both ideals and interests, and they are firmly rooted in the American historical experience. In their application, at home and abroad, nation-building efforts have empowered some groups and victimised others. American self-righteousness encourages a denial of the costs, the damage and the victims. The evidence of victimisation motivates many observers to question whether the ideals behind American nation-building are serious in the first place. Freedom and liberation for one set of actors connotes repression and imprisonment for another set.

Conclusion: the strange career of nation-building and current policy-making

Both perspectives are, of course, based in fact. American nation-building has spread self-governance and limited it at the same time. It has encouraged wealth-creation and contributed to continued impoverishment. It has ensured peace and instigated war. History is not about simple verdicts, despite the frequent tendency of some historians to offer glib judgements. The record of American nation-building spans more than three centuries and a vast global geography. The impulses behind American efforts and their larger aims have remained consistent, but the consequences are widely diverse. They defy simple categorisation.

In writing the *Strange Career of Jim Crow*, C. Vann Woodward wanted to shake his self-satisfied readers out of the simple categories they used for understanding their own society. He embraced the nobility of the American ambition to spread democracy, order, peace and wealth. He dissected the severe limitations of American racism, ethnocentrism and militarism. Most of all, Woodward counselled for a careful effort to match ideals with circumstances, to make the power of American society serve the hopes of its citizens – all its citizens. This did not mean abandoning the vision of a world with well-functioning governing institutions, but instead renewing activity to build institutions that really served that purpose.

The Civil Rights Movement followed that path in the decade-and-a-half after Woodward published his important book. American foreign policy did not do the same in Vietnam. The overwhelming militarisation of American international activities, the ideological rigidity of American foreign perceptions and the political urge to find quick solutions to international problems

have constrained the careful matching of ideals with circumstances, as well as means and ends, that Woodward recommended.²⁷

The fundamental problem for American foreign policy is not the nation-building vision so deeply held in the popular conscience. For better and for worse, that is not going to change anytime soon. It is too central to American identity. The contemporary challenge for policy-makers is to apply that intellectual architecture strategically to the problems of the day.

Instead of reacting to threats by launching its power against adversaries and speaking superficially about democratisation, American leaders must have the self-understanding to choose their battles carefully. Where, when and how can the United States encourage productive nation-building? Where, when and how should it refrain and wait? These are the core questions that must underpin a successful policy-making process. These are the core questions that will turn the intellectual assumptions held by Americans into a prudent platform for nurturing a truly better world, at least from the American point of view. The contradictions between ideals and interests will not disappear, but they can be managed to better effect in the United States and abroad.

Notes

- 1 C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 3–4.
- 2 See M. D. Lassiter and J. Crespino, *The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); J. C. Cobb, *Away Down South: A History of Southern Identity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Recent scholarship on American political history has extended this examination of the ‘strange career’ to include the sunbelt southwest. See D. Dochuk, *From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011); B. Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
- 3 See F. Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); M. H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); W. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); T. J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); P. Baker, *Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House* (New York: Doubleday, 2013).
- 4 On these points, see J. M. Cooper, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2009); R. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–45* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

- 5 Remarks by President Barack Obama at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony (28 May 2014), available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-west-point-academy-commencement-ceremony (accessed 7 July 2016).
- 6 On this point, see Robert Kagan's prominent and widely cited critique of President Obama's foreign policy: 'Superpowers don't get to retire: what our tired country still owes the world', *New Republic* (26 May 2014), available at: www.newrepublic.com/article/117859/allure-normalcy-what-america-still-owes-world (accessed 30 May 2014).
- 7 See M. Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013).
- 8 See F. Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18; F. Fukuyama, *The End of the History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992). Henry Kissinger has been one of the most consistent critics of the ahistorical assumptions behind American foreign policy. As a policy-maker he, ironically, replayed many of these assumptions. See J. Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 138–96.
- 9 On these points, see F. Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); M. E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); N. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); D. Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
- 10 This is an argument articulated most clearly in Louis Hartz's famous book *The Liberal Tradition in America* (Orlando: Harcourt, Brace, 1955). See also R. Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948). For a more recent analysis, see R. Haberski, Jr., *God and War: American Civil Religion since 1945* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012).
- 11 See D. C. Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations, 1789–1941* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2009).
- 12 See D. H. Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
- 13 See J. Suri, *Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama* (New York: Free Press, 2011).
- 14 Francis Scott Key wrote the 'Star-Spangled Banner' in September 1814, amidst the British shelling of Fort McHenry in the Chesapeake Bay. It became the official US national anthem, by congressional resolution and presidential signature, in 1931.
- 15 D. Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

- 16 See P. Novick, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); David S. Brown, *Beyond the Frontier: The Midwestern Voice in American Historical Writing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
- 17 On the historical and intellectual roots of the contemporary Tea Party in the United States, see J. Lepore, *The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle Over American History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); G. Packer, *The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2013).
- 18 See Suri, *Liberty's Surest Guardian*.
- 19 For discussions of Kissinger and Obama in this context, see Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*; D. Remnick, *The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama* (New York: Random House, 2010); J. T. Kloppenberg, *Reading Obama: Dreams, Hope, and the American Political Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
- 20 See the chapters Woodward added and revised on 'The Career Becomes Stranger' and 'Afterword'. Oxford University Press published the final edition of *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* in 2001, two years after Woodward's death. For the classic account of Republican Party ideology – and its limitations – in the Civil War era, see E. Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
- 21 See the classic statement in W. A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959). See his fuller statement in W. A. Williams, *The Contours of American History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988).
- 22 Among the many important recent books on this topic, see O. A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); G. Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006); A. W. McCoy and F. A. Scarano (eds), *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
- 23 See M. W. Ghachem, *The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); M. A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); L. Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012).
- 24 See S. B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); T. Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). On the popular movement against apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s, in opposition to friendly US relations with the Afrikaner regime, see A. Klotz, 'Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and U.S. sanctions against South Africa', *International Organization*, 49 (Summer 1995), pp. 451–78.

- 25 See M. Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: New Press, 2010); B. Useem and A. M. Piehl, *Prison State: The Challenge of Mass Incarceration* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- 26 For recent elaborations on Woodward's pioneering work on these topics, see S. Hahn, *A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); E. L. Ayers, *The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
- 27 These are criticisms articulated, ironically, by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who served presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. See R. M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014).